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The beginning of this year has seen further 
advances in stemming the tide of the euro-area 
crisis and setting right the remaining weaknesses 
in the economic governance framework. To be 
sure, during the course of last year the euro area 
was already put on a more stable institutional 
footing. A far-reaching drive at the European 
level has ensured that the vulnerabilities and 
blind spots that first gave rise to the crisis are 
being corrected.  
Overall, the EU has responded to the many 
pressing challenges thrown up by the crisis 
based on a five-point strategy. First, credible 
adjustment programmes have been put in place 
in vulnerable Member States. Second, good 
progress has been made in establishing an 
adequate firewall against contagion in sovereign-
debt markets. Third, a better capitalisation of EU 
banks is well underway, which has eased 
funding stress. Fourth, structural measures to 
boost economic growth potential are being put in 
place at the Member State and EU level. Finally, 
a stronger and more comprehensive economic 
governance framework has been created for the 
EU and the euro area. These elements make up 
the foundations for a stronger euro area, but their 
beneficial impact hinges on their stringent 
implementation by Member States.  
A number of these policy areas have seen recent 
advancement. In March, 25 Member States 
signed the so-called 'fiscal compact', which adds 
to the array of governance reform measures 
already enacted and will ensure that fiscal 
discipline is further strengthened. It will 
introduce stricter fiscal surveillance within the 
euro area, notably by establishing a balanced 
budget rule that must be transposed into national 
legislation within one year under the auspices of 
the EU Court of Justice. Financial firewalls have 
also been strengthened, with the Eurogroup 
agreeing on 30 March on a combined lending 
capacity of the EFSF and ESM of €700bn, 
consisting of €200bn of existing EFSF lending 
commitments to programme countries and a 
maximum of €500bn of fresh lending from the 
ESM. The EFSF will co-exist alongside the 
ESM until June 2013, with the ESM however 
being the main instrument to finance new 
programmes as from July 2012.  
Support for vulnerable Member States is also 
being developed further, with Euro-area Heads 
of State and Government having set out a 
roadmap for Greece in March. Following the 
Eurogroup's agreement with the Greek 
government in February on domestic policy 
reform, Greece has already passed new laws in 
the areas of fiscal consolidation, revenue 
administration, pension reform, financial 
regulation and growth-enhancing structural 
reforms. The second financial assistance 
programme, financed jointly by the EU and IMF, 
was approved on 14/15 March. The programme 
will amount to €130bn and will run until 2014. 
Operationally, programme implementation will 
take on a new quality, as an expanded Taskforce 
for Greece as well as permanent representatives 
of the Troika in Athens will encourage greater 
ownership on the part of the Greek authorities. 
Finally, the Greek sovereign bond exchange for 
private sector investors successfully closed on 
8 March, covering most of the outstanding 
principal in privately held sovereign debt. This 
makes a substantial contribution to the 
overarching aim of ensuring debt sustainability.  
When looking at the latest economic 
developments the importance of having set up a 
durable crisis prevention infrastructure is 
underlined, as the euro-area economy has once 
again entered a recessionary period. The latest 
interim forecast of the European Commission, 
presented on 23 February, points to a mild 
recession in the euro area, with annual GDP 
contracting slightly in 2012. However, modest 
growth is predicted to return in the second half 
of the year. At the level of the individual 
Member States, growth divergences remain 
large, and downside risks are still dominant on 
balance. In particular, an aggravation of the 
sovereign debt crisis may ultimately result in a 
credit crunch and a prolonged and deeper 
recession. On the back of persistently high 
energy prices, inflation has remained higher than 
forecast in autumn and is expected to decelerate 
slowly over the forecast horizon to reach just 
over 2% for 2012 as a whole. 
In the context of its strengthened economic 
surveillance role, the Commission presented its 
first annual Alert Mechanism Report on 14 
February. This forms the starting point of 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), 
a surveillance tool devised to detect and correct 
risky macroeconomic developments in the EU 
and the euro area, and thereby strengthens the 
economic pillar of EMU. The MIP forms part of 
the so-called "six-pack" that entered into force 
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on 13 December 2011. Given the central role 
that the procedure plays in the integrated 
surveillance framework of the EU and in view of 
the considerable and diverse macroeconomic 
imbalances still present in the euro area, this 
Quarterly Report dedicates its Focus section to 
an in-depth examination of the MIP.  
The MIP has been conceived to identify 
potential risks early on, to prevent the 
emergence of harmful imbalances and to correct 
excessive imbalances already present. It does so 
by ensuring that appropriate policy responses are 
adopted in Member States to address the 
underlying problems. A 'corrective' surveillance 
arm applicable to all EU Member States is 
supplemented in the case of euro-area countries 
by an enforcement mechanism comprising 
financial sanctions. In the coming months and in 
the context of the European semester, the 
Commission will prepare in-depth reviews for 
countries identified in the Alert Mechanism 
report on the basis of a 10-point scoreboard as 
warranting further in-depth examination. 
One of the clearest instances of potentially 
harmful economic imbalances lies in external 
borrowing and indebtedness trends. Despite 
some rebalancing since the beginning of the 
crisis, current account positions across Member 
States are still relatively divergent, and countries 
that have accumulated the largest net external 
debt stocks still need to adjust further. Starting 
from this observation, a special topic in this 
edition examines trends in the external financing 
of current account positions. One key 
development since 2008 has been the gradual 
shift away from market-based external funding 
for vulnerable countries towards official forms 
of financing, notably through EU/IMF 
programme lending and liquidity transfers via 
the Eurosystem. This has bridged the financing 
gap that the large outflow of private capital from 
these economies would have left, and which 
would have forced a sudden and disruptive 
current account adjustment on them.  
A further section in this report assesses the 
exposure of the euro area and its Member States 
to sovereign CDS, the possible systemic role of 
which has commanded much attention since the  
 
 
beginning of the crisis and even more lately 
against the background of the Greek sovereign 
bond exchange. The analysis finds that the 
sovereign CDS market overall appears to be 
functioning well, with no evidence of significant 
mispricing. Market participants' exposure related 
to euro-area Member States has been stable 
during the crisis, and the systemic importance of 
CDS exposure appears relatively limited. And 
while full market transparency is still lacking in 
some respects, numerous regulatory 
improvements at the EU have greatly reduced 
the potential for unreported or purely speculative 
CDS trading. 
Finally, on the fiscal front, the widespread 
deterioration of public finances during the crisis 
has brought consolidation needs to the top of 
policy priorities. Though the required adjustment 
may in some cases be large, the exact manner in 
which such deficits are reduced can make a 
difference to both short-term growth and longer-
term growth potential. A special topic in this 
Quarterly Report therefore investigates the role 
that taxation measures can play in achieving 
growth-friendly budgetary consolidation. 
Additional tax measures should not be passed 
lightly, as virtually all forms of taxation are 
economically distorting and may thereby harm 
jobs and growth. An increase in the tax burden 
should be contingent on country-specific 
circumstances, and to this end the section 
develops a set of indicators to identify Member 
States with a need and room for tax increases. 
Looking at factors such as a country's tax-to-
GDP ratio, the thrust of the assessment is to 
explore the scope for increasing tax categories 
least detrimental to growth. While the overall 
need for consolidation is already firmly 
established, some open questions surrounding its 
implementation can now hopefully be answered 
better. 
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I.1. Introduction 
The unravelling of the economic and financial 
crisis of recent years has laid bare some 
weaknesses in the surveillance arrangements 
within EMU and the framework for coordinating 
economic policies in general. In particular, the 
build-up of macroeconomic imbalances in pre-
crisis years was not checked sufficiently and their 
unwinding has since proven very costly for some 
euro-area countries and has also contributed to the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis, with serious 
implications for the functioning of the euro area 
as a whole. 
These developments show the need to broaden the 
economic governance framework underpinning 
EMU so as to include the issue of unsustainable 
macroeconomic trends. The new procedure for the 
prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances — the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP) — responds to this need and was 
one of the key building blocks of the legislative 
package (the ‘six-pack’) to enhance the 
governance structures in EMU. (1) This focus 
section describes further the economic rationale of 
the MIP, how it will work and the state of play, 
given that it is currently being applied for the first 
time in the context of the 2012 European 
Semester. 
                                                        
(1) Besides the Regulations introducing the MIP, the ‘six-pack’ 
includes enhancements in the Stability and Growth Pact and 
national fiscal frameworks. It has been in place since 
December 2011. 
I.2. Macroeconomic imbalances in the 
euro area 
One of the salient features of the first decade of 
the euro area’s existence was the gradual 
accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances. 
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of such 
imbalances was the increasing divergence in 
external positions. Some Member States saw their 
current account deficit rise to staggering levels 
while others accumulated substantial current 
account surpluses (Graph I.1). 
The mounting current account deficits and 
surpluses were a counterpart to strong capital 
flows across the euro-area members. These were 
boosted by the establishment of the euro and 
progress in financial market integration in the 
euro area. 
Capital inflows benefited mostly those Member 
States which in the run-up to EMU experienced 
the largest reductions in nominal interest rates and 
where the real returns on investment appeared the 
highest. 
While the observed developments partially 
reflected sound catching-up processes, 
particularly in the initial period, they also had 
much less benign repercussions and became a 
significant ingredient of unsustainable 
macroeconomic trends in some countries. Part of 
the capital flows was channelled into 
unproductive uses and fuelled domestic demand 
In the first decade of the euro’s existence, many euro-area countries witnessed a build-up of macroeconomic 
imbalances. These vulnerabilities proved to be highly damaging once the financial crisis set in. The ongoing 
unwinding of the accumulated macroeconomic imbalances is a protracted process and the adjustment is 
proving to be particularly painful in terms of growth and employment. Against this background, the recently 
adopted Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) broadens the EU economic governance framework to 
include the surveillance of unsustainable macroeconomic trends. The aim of the MIP is to identify potential 
risks early on, prevent the emergence of harmful imbalances and correct the excessive imbalances that are 
already in place. It has a broad scope and encompasses both external imbalances (including competitiveness 
trends) and internal imbalances. While the design of the MIP builds on experience gained from the recent 
crisis, it is flexible enough to take on board new trends and developments as potential future crises may have 
different origins. Its objective is to ensure that appropriate policy responses are adopted in Member States in a 
timely manner to address the pressing issues raised by macroeconomic imbalances. In doing so, the MIP relies 
on a graduated approach that reflects the gravity of imbalances and can eventually lead to the imposition of 
sanctions on euro-area members should they repeatedly fail to meet their obligations. Implementation of the 
MIP started with the Commission publishing in February its first Alert Mechanism Report, which identifies a 
group of Member States for which more in-depth analysis is warranted. Following the completion of these in-
depth reviews, policy guidance will be issued where appropriate and further steps decided. 
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Graph I.1: Current account positions in the 
euro area, % of GDP (1) 
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(1) Surplus countries: BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, AT, FI and SE.
Deficit countries: BG, CZ, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, 
HU, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK and UK.
Surplus/deficit countries grouped on the basis of average current 
account positions between 2000 and 2010. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Graph I.2: Private credit growth and current 
account positions, % (2000 - 2007) (1) 
BE
DE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
LU
NL
AT
PT
FI
R² = 0.3657
5
10
15
20
25
30
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Pr
iva
te
 cr
ed
it (
av
er
ag
e 
'00
-'0
7)
Current account (average '00-'07)
 
(1) Note: Average private credit (transactions) as % of GDP and 
average current account over 2000-2007. 
Source: Commission services 
booms, which were associated with excessive 
credit expansions in the private and/or public 
sectors and housing bubbles in some euro-area 
members. The links between external imbalances 
and imbalances building up in domestic sectors of 
euro-area economies can be seen in Graph I.2, 
which shows that the excessive credit expansions 
stimulated demand and pushed current accounts 
into deep deficits in some Member States. In 
particular, countries such as Greece, Spain or 
Ireland experienced rather fast rates of growth that 
were to a large degree driven by domestic demand 
booms and, with the exception of Greece, housing 
booms and expansions in the construction sectors 
(Graph I.3). 
The expansion of domestic demand generated 
upward pressure on prices, which was particularly 
strong in non-tradable sectors. The resulting 
changes in relative prices induced a reallocation 
of resources in the economy towards the non-
tradable sectors and, on the whole, resulted in 
substantial losses in price and cost 
competitiveness. This can be clearly seen from the 
developments in competitiveness indicators, such 
as real effective exchange rates or unit labour 
costs, which document the increasing divergences 
in the euro area. Faced with strong demand 
pressures, some countries were also unable to 
react appropriately to negative productivity 
shocks. 
Graph I.3: Domestic demand and house price 
growth, % (2000 - 2007) (1) 
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(1) Certain Member States are omitted due to lack of data 
availability. 
Source: Commission services 
Moreover, some euro-area countries have shown a 
worrying gradual deterioration in export market 
shares. Changes in shares of world export markets 
for goods and services point to potentially large 
structural losses in overall competitiveness in the 
global economy. In some countries, this may 
reflect the already discussed losses in price/cost 
competitiveness or the diversion of resources to 
the non-tradable sector during domestic 
absorption booms, but an important role also 
seems to be played by relative losses in non-price 
competitiveness and low ability to exploit new 
sales opportunities. As a result, the export 
performance of some euro-area countries has been 
lagging behind not only the dynamic global 
competitors such as China but also other euro-area 
peers. 
Conversely, domestic demand in other Member 
States appears to have been constrained, in part, 
due to existing rigidities in product markets. This, 
together with mispricing of risk in financial 
markets and the related outflows of capital, 
resulted in growing current account surpluses. 
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When the crisis struck, the existence of large 
imbalances proved highly damaging: their 
unwinding contributed, particularly in the euro 
area, to the gravity and propagation of the crisis in 
a number of Member States by deepening the 
contraction as well as aggravating the situation of 
public finances. Implicit or explicit government 
guarantees for the troubled banking sector 
resulted in the transfer of risk from private to 
public sector. Additionally, sharp contractions in 
the overblown sectors, e.g. construction, and the 
related increases in unemployment contributed to 
the deterioration of public finances through falling 
tax revenues and increased unemployment 
support. Moreover, the sovereign debt crisis that 
hit Greece, Ireland and Portugal generated strong 
cross-border spillover effects through the loss of 
confidence by financial markets. This underlines 
the need for an EU/euro area-wide approach to the 
surveillance of imbalances. 
While current account positions have converged 
to some extent since the onset of the crisis, there 
is still considerable scope for adjustment and 
rebalancing in the euro area. In particular, the 
large accumulated stocks of debt will require 
prolonged repair of balance sheets in both public 
and private sectors. Moreover, some of the most 
affected countries still run non-negligible current 
account deficits that point to the need for external 
financing, which is difficult to secure given the 
distress in financial markets. (2) Finally, more 
pronounced relative price adjustment than 
experienced so far is necessary to ensure that the 
corrections in external imbalances prove to be 
lasting and not associated with the build-up of 
persistent internal imbalances such as a high rate 
of structural unemployment. 
I.3. The MIP as a tool to tackle 
macroeconomic imbalances 
In view of these hard-learned lessons, the MIP has 
been conceived to identify potential risks early on, 
prevent the emergence of harmful imbalances and 
correct the excessive imbalances that are already 
in place. Its objective is to ensure that appropriate 
policy responses are adopted in Member States to 
address the pressing issues raised by 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Today, it is relatively straightforward to see that 
in the years preceding the crisis, low financing 
costs and other factors fuelled a misallocation of 
resources, often to less productive uses, feeding 
                                                        
(2) See also the special topic on capital flows in this Quarterly 
Report. 
unsustainable levels of consumption, housing 
bubbles and the accumulation of external and 
internal debt. Indeed, previous Commission 
analysis did identify imbalances in several areas 
of the EU/euro-area economies. (3) However, at 
the time, the policy discussions and responses 
were not systematic and lacked teeth. 
As regards the policy responses, alongside sound 
fiscal policies and appropriate financial 
regulation, growth-enhancing structural policies 
are key to addressing the issue of macroeconomic 
imbalances. Such policies help stimulate the 
supply side of the economy, increase 
competitiveness and improve adjustment capacity 
— this is essential in countries experiencing 
external deficits. Such policies can mitigate the 
adverse growth effects of the deleveraging. At the 
same time, they boost domestic demand to the 
extent that it is constrained by market and policy 
failures — this is relevant for surplus countries 
with anaemic domestic demand. 
Nevertheless, there are significant analytical 
challenges involved in the identification of 
excessive imbalances that are also reflected in the 
design of the procedure. 
Most importantly, macroeconomic imbalances are 
part of everyday reality and in many cases they 
can be justified by the underlying economic 
developments. For example, external imbalances 
do not necessarily need to be worrisome if 
deficits/surpluses are efficient market-based 
responses to changes in underlying fundamentals 
and the related saving and investment decisions of 
households or businesses. Similarly, ‘downhill’ 
capital flows from rich to less well-off countries 
are usually seen as a positive development that 
facilitates economic convergence as they help 
catching-up countries cover their domestic 
financing gaps. To the extent that capital inflows 
are used for building up productive capacity, they 
boost future growth prospects and the ability to 
repay the borrowed capital. However, if they 
become excessive and are driven by policy or 
market failures, they can have dire repercussions. 
This also reflects the fact that imbalances are a 
result of complex economic interactions involving 
                                                        
(3) For example, in the framework of the Commission’s review 
of competitiveness developments and imbalances, informal 
surveillance in the Eurogroup and assessments in the context 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon strategy. An 
overview of the Commission’s analysis can be found in the 
special issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area on 
‘The impact of the global crisis on competitiveness and 
current account divergences in the euro area’, Volume 9 No 1 
(2010).  
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different sectors within as well as outside the 
national economy. Consequently, the underlying 
indicators of imbalances cannot be seen as policy 
objectives as they are not under the direct 
influence of policy-makers (unlike in the case of 
fiscal policy). 
What is more, the nature of imbalances can 
change over time and past experience can give 
only limited guidance on how and where they are 
likely to appear. 
I.4. How the MIP works 
The overall design of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure follows the implicit logic of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, with a ‘preventive’ 
arm and a stronger ‘corrective’ arm for more 
serious cases. For euro-area countries, the 
corrective arm is supplemented by an enforcement 
mechanism including the possibility of financial 
sanctions. (4) 
I.4.1. The preventive arm and the alert 
mechanism 
To detect macroeconomic imbalances, the 
procedure relies on a two-step approach. The first 
step consists of an alert mechanism aiming to 
identify Member States where there are signs of 
potentially emerging macroeconomic imbalances 
and which therefore require more in-depth 
examination. In the second step, the in-depth 
reviews undertaken for the identified Member 
States assess whether there are imbalances and, if 
so, their nature and extent. 
The objective of the alert mechanism is to identify 
macroeconomic imbalances as soon as they 
emerge so that necessary policy actions can be 
taken in due time to prevent them from becoming 
damaging for the Member State concerned and 
from jeopardising the functioning of the euro area. 
More specifically, the alert mechanism consists of 
an indicator-based scoreboard (presented in detail 
in the next section) together with an economic 
reading thereof, presented in an annual Alert 
Mechanism Report (AMR). It should be stressed 
that the scoreboard is just one component of the 
alert mechanism, and additional relevant 
                                                        
(4) The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure rests on two 
pieces of legislation. The first Regulation (EU 1176/2011) 
sets out the details of the new surveillance procedure and 
covers all the Member States. The second Regulation 
(EU 1174/2011) establishes the enforcement mechanism, 
including the potential use of sanctions, and only applies to 
the euro-area Member States. 
indicators, economic circumstances and country-
specific situations are taken into account. 
The alert mechanism is an initial ‘filter’ where the 
outcome is to identify countries and issues for 
which more in-depth analysis is required. The 
conclusions of the AMR are discussed in the 
Council and the Eurogroup to enable the 
Commission to obtain appropriate feedback from 
Member States. The Commission then decides on 
the final list of countries for which it will prepare 
country-specific in-depth reviews. 
It is only the in-depth reviews that lead to 
eventual policy guidance to be issued to Member 
States. The reviews will undertake thorough 
analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances, in 
particularly as regards their nature and extent, 
taking into account the economic and structural 
specificities of the Member State considered. 
If, on the basis of this analysis, the Commission 
considers the situation unproblematic it will 
conclude that no further steps are needed. If, 
however, the Commission considers that 
macroeconomic imbalances exist, it may come 
forward with proposals for policy 
recommendations for the Member State(s) 
concerned. In the preventive arm, these will be 
part of the integrated package of 
recommendations under the European Semester. 
This is particularly important since policy 
remedies to address imbalances cover to a very 
large extent policies (e.g. labour market, product 
market and fiscal policies) that may also be 
subject to other surveillance processes. If the 
Commission instead considers that there are 
severe imbalances, it may recommend that the 
Council open an excessive imbalance procedure, 
which constitutes the corrective arm of the new 
procedure. Graph I.4 sums up the entire process 
graphically. 
I.4.2. The corrective arm and effective 
enforcement 
As mentioned above, the corrective arm includes 
an enforcement dimension that applies only to 
euro-area Member States. While decisions are 
normally taken in the Council by qualified 
majority voting, in this procedure several of the 
key Council decisions are taken by reverse 
qualified majority voting (RQMV). In the case of 
RQMV, a novelty for many of the key 
enforcement decisions across the ‘six-pack’, a 
I. The surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area 
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Council decision on a Commission 
recommendation is deemed to be adopted by the 
Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to 
reject the recommendation within ten days of the 
Commission adopting it. The aim of this voting 
rule is to increase the automaticity of the decision-
making process. 
If the in-depth review points to severe imbalances 
in a Member State, the Council declares the 
existence of an excessive imbalance and adopts a 
recommendation asking the Member State to 
present corrective actions by a specified deadline. 
Then, and this is a key feature of this new 
procedure, the Member State has to present a 
corrective action plan (CAP) setting up a roadmap 
to implement corrective policy actions. The CAP 
should be a detailed plan for corrective actions 
with specific policy actions and an 
implementation timetable. This timetable and the 
follow-up will be tailored to the country-specific 
situation and can thus depart from the European 
Semester cycle. 
As regards the content of the CAP it is clear that 
the policy response to the macroeconomic 
imbalances has to be tailored to the circumstances 
of the Member State concerned and where needed 
will cover the main policy areas, including fiscal 
and wage policies, labour markets, product and 
services markets and the financial sector. 
Moreover, efficiency and credibility depend on 
consistent approaches across policy strands. As 
described above, to this end consistency must be 
ensured with the policy advice given in the 
context of the European Semester. 
After the Member State has submitted its CAP, 
the Council assesses it with two possible 
outcomes: 
• If the Council considers the CAP to be 
insufficient, it adopts a recommendation to the 
Member State calling on it to submit a new 
CAP. If the new CAP is still considered to be 
insufficient, a fine can be imposed (by RQMV, 
see below) for having failed twice in a row to 
submit a sufficient CAP (0.1 % of GDP). Thus 
the Member State cannot stall the procedure 
by not presenting a satisfactory CAP. 
• If the Council considers the CAP to be 
sufficient, it will endorse the CAP through a 
recommendation that lists the corrective 
actions and their implementation deadlines. 
Once a sufficient CAP is in place, the Council 
will then assess whether or not the Member State 
concerned has taken the recommended actions 
according to the deadlines set. Two outcomes are 
possible: 
• If the Council considers that the Member State 
concerned has not taken the recommended 
corrective action, it will adopt a decision 
establishing non-compliance together with a 
recommendation setting new deadlines for 
taking corrective action. In this case, the 
enforcement regime established by the 
Regulation comes into play. It consists of a 
two-step approach. In case non-compliance 
with the issued recommendation is established 
for the first time, the Council may impose an 
Graph I.4: The two-step MIP procedure 
 
Source: Commission services 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2012 
 
- 12 -
interesting-bearing deposit (0.1 % of GDP). 
Once the Council establishes non-compliance 
for a second time, it can convert the deposit 
into an annual fine. These decisions are taken 
by RQMV. 
• If the Council decides, on the basis of a 
Commission recommendation, that the 
Member State concerned has taken the 
recommended corrective action, but 
imbalances are not yet corrected, the 
procedure will be placed in abeyance. The 
Member State continues to be subject to 
periodic reporting. If the Council considers 
that the Member State concerned has taken the 
appropriate action and the Member State is no 
longer experiencing excessive imbalances, the 
EIP will finally be closed. 
I.5. The role and design of the MIP 
scoreboard 
The scoreboard is an important component of the 
alert mechanism and is intended to facilitate the 
identification of trends that require closer 
examination. As mentioned above, it is not 
interpreted mechanically and economic judgment 
is employed when interpreting its results. 
The indicators that are included in the scoreboard 
cover the most relevant areas of imbalances that 
are under the scope of the MIP. In line with the 
different challenges faced by the EU/euro-area 
countries, it comprises indicators of external 
positions (current account and net international 
investment position), competitiveness 
developments (real effective exchange rates, unit 
labour cost, export market shares) and indicators 
of internal imbalances (private sector and general 
government debt, private sector credit flow, house 
prices and the unemployment rate). The 
scoreboard thus encompasses variables that both 
the economic literature and recent experience 
establish as being linked to economic crises. 
This broad coverage of the scoreboard makes it 
possible to take into account the versatile nature 
of imbalances and their close interlinkages. As 
discussed above, the developments in external 
imbalances are typically intrinsically linked to 
internal developments (e.g. the domestic 
counterpart to excessive external debt is excessive 
private or public debt). In such a case, internal 
indicators show whether risks associated with 
external imbalances are concentrated in specific 
sectors of the economy. In some cases, individual 
indicators on their own can point to specific risks 
that need to be addressed. In particular, some 
internal imbalances can have repercussions for 
other Member States via financial contagion. 
For the sake of transparency and easy 
communication, the scoreboard contains a limited 
number of simple indicators of high statistical 
quality. It combines stock and flow indicators that 
can capture both shorter-term rapid deteriorations 
and the longer-term gradual accumulation of 
imbalances. 
To facilitate the use of the scoreboard, indicative 
thresholds have been set for each indicator. These 
thresholds are mostly based on a simple statistical 
approach and are set at lower and/or upper 
quartiles of the historical distributions of the 
indicator values. These statistically determined 
thresholds are broadly in line with the findings of 
economic literature on the early-warning 
properties of different indicators in terms of 
predicting economic and financial crises. The 
breach of the indicative thresholds does not 
automatically trigger an ‘alarm’ in the form of a 
requirement for an in-depth review, though. Only 
the comprehensive economic reading of the result 
of the scoreboard, which takes into account 
additional information, indicates a need for further 
analysis. 
The scoreboard takes into account the euro-area 
dimension and differentiates between euro-area 
and non-euro area Member States where 
appropriate. Due to differences in exchange rate 
regimes, the behaviour of some economic 
variables in the euro area is different from the 
non-euro area countries. This argues in favour of 
using different alert thresholds for euro-area and 
non-euro area Member States for indicators such 
as REERs and ULC developments. With respect 
to REERs, a differentiation in the indicative 
thresholds reflects greater nominal exchange rate 
variability in the non-euro area countries. For 
ULC, an additional margin was added to the 
indicative threshold for non-euro area countries 
because most of them have experienced major 
trade liberalisation since the mid-1990s that 
entails a natural process of factor price 
equalisation towards the levels of trade partners. 
These strong adjustment processes due to trade 
liberalisation should, however, be considered 
weaker in the future and the threshold reassessed. 
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At present, the scoreboard includes ten 
indicators: (5) 
• three-year backward moving average of the 
current account balance in per cent of GDP, 
with a threshold of +6 % and -4 %; 
• net international investment position in per 
cent of GDP, with a threshold of -35 %; 
• five-year percentage change of export market 
shares measured in values, with a threshold of 
-6 %; 
• three-year percentage change in nominal unit 
labour cost (ULC), with thresholds of +9 % 
for euro-area countries and +12 % for non-euro 
area countries respectively; 
• three-year percentage change of the real 
effective exchange rates (REERs) based on 
HICP/CPI deflators, relative to 35 other 
industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5 % 
for euro-area countries and -/+11 % for non-
euro area countries respectively; 
• private sector debt in per cent of GDP, with a 
threshold of 160 %; 
• private sector credit flow in per cent of GDP, 
with a threshold of 15 %; 
• year-on-year changes in the house price 
index relative to a Eurostat consumption 
deflator, with a threshold of 6 %; 
• general government sector debt in per cent 
of GDP, with a threshold of 60 %; 
• three-year backward moving average of the 
unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10 %. 
In view of the need to adjust to evolving 
macroeconomic conditions, the composition of 
the scoreboard is flexible. The design of the 
scoreboard could change over time to take into 
account improvements in data availability or 
enhancements in the underlying analysis and, 
even more importantly, new sources of potentially 
harmful macroeconomic imbalances that might 
develop in the future. Some changes in the 
scoreboard are already planned for the next annual 
cycle of surveillance: to capture possible 
                                                        
(5) For a detailed discussion per indicator, see European 
Commission (2012), ‘Scoreboard for the surveillance of 
macroeconomic imbalances’, European Economy, 
Occasional Paper No 92 (February). 
imbalances in the financial sector, an additional 
internal indicator will be included by the end of 
2012. 
Recognising the critical importance of taking due 
account of country-specific circumstances and 
institutions, the economic reading of the 
scoreboard is complemented by additional 
information and indicators. This includes inter 
alia the general macroeconomic situation, such as 
growth and employment developments, nominal 
and real convergence inside and outside the euro 
area and specificities of catching-up economies. 
Additional indicators are considered that reflect 
the potential for the emergence of imbalances as 
well as the adjustment capacity of an economy, 
including its potential to sustain sound and 
balanced growth, such as different measures of 
productivity, inflows of FDI, capacity to innovate 
and energy dependence. The state of financial 
markets, which played an important role in the 
current crisis, will also be covered. 
I.6. The 2012 Alert Mechanism Report 
and the way forward 
As a first step in implementing the MIP, the 
Commission published its first Alert Mechanism 
Report on 14 February 2012. 
This was done in a context of highly uncertain 
economic circumstances. All EU Member States 
are currently dealing with the adjustment to the 
impact of the crisis, although the challenges differ 
in terms of scope and severity. In addition to 
correcting the significant imbalances that built up 
over previous years, they are also dealing with the 
interrelated challenges of tackling low growth and 
high unemployment, ensuring sustainable public 
finances and restoring stability in the financial 
system. It is evident that a painful crisis-driven 
adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances is 
under way in many Member States, especially 
those that have or had high external deficits and 
large imbalances on household and corporate 
balance sheets. 
Against this background, the first AMR made an 
economic reading of the scoreboard as provided 
for by the legislation and on this basis 12 Member 
States were identified as warranting in-depth 
reviews on different aspects of possible 
imbalances (see Table I.1 with the MIP 
scoreboard). Seven of them are euro-area 
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members: Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Finland. The four programme 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Romania) 
were not covered in the assessment as they are 
already under an enhanced programme-based 
surveillance regime. 
The issues raised in the AMR as requiring further 
examination varied among the Member States 
concerned but to a large extent reflect the 
continuous adjustment to the imbalances built up 
in the years before the crisis described in 
Section I.2. Some countries need to correct 
accumulated imbalances on both the internal and 
the external side while others have to deal with 
issues concentrated in specific parts of the 
economy. 
In particular, high levels of overall indebtedness 
appear challenging for a number of euro-area 
countries. While excessive credit flows have 
largely adjusted, many Member States are left 
with high levels of private sector indebtedness and 
are set for a likely prolonged process of 
deleveraging and adjustment in sectoral balance 
sheets (Graph I.5). In a number of cases, the 
deleveraging challenge for households and/or 
businesses is compounded by the high levels of 
public debt. The impact of deleveraging in the 
private sector could be magnified by the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis exerting pressure on highly 
indebted public sectors. Elevated amounts of debt 
in the hands of non-residents can prove to be an 
additional concern in a context of high uncertainty 
in international financial markets. 
Graph I.5: Gross indebtedness by institutional 
sector, % of GDP, 2010 (1) 
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(1) Programme countries are marked with an asterisk. 
Source: Commission services 
Linked to the continuous build-up of indebtedness 
in the private sector, some countries also display 
developments in asset markets, in particular 
housing, that also warrant further analysis. This 
can be seen from Graph I.6, which shows the high 
cumulative house price increases in the upswing 
preceding the crisis in a number of euro-area 
countries and the limited adjustment that has 
taken place so far. 
 
Table I.1: MIP scoreboard 2012 (1) 
Thresholds - 4/6% - 35% ± 5% & ± 11% - 6% 9% & 12% + 6%  15% 160% 60% 10%
BE -0.6 77.8 1.3 -15.4 8.5 0.4 13.1 233 96 7.7
DE 5.9 38.4 -2.9 -8.3 6.6 -1.0 3.1 128 83 7.5
EE -0.8 -72.8 5.9 -0.9 9.3 -2.1 -8.6 176 7 12.0
IE -2.7 -90.9 -5.0 -12.8 -2.3 -10.5 -4.5 341 93 10.6
EL -12.1 -92.5 3.9 -20.0 12.8 -6.8 -0.7 124 145 9.9
ES -6.5 -89.5 0.6 -11.6 3.3 -4.3 1.4 227 61 16.5
FR -1.7 -10.0 -1.4 -19.4 7.2 3.6 2.4 160 82 9.0
IT -2.8 -23.9 -1.0 -19.0 7.8 -1.5 3.6 126 118 7.6
CY -12.1 -43.4 0.8 -19.4 7.2 -6.6 30.5 289 62 5.1
LU 6.4 96.5 1.9 3.2 17.3 3.0 -41.8 254 19 4.9
MT -5.4 9.2 -0.6 6.9 7.7 -1.6 6.9 212 69 6.6
NL 5.0 28.0 -1.0 -8.1 7.4 -2.9 -0.7 223 63 3.8
AT 3.5 -9.8 -1.3 -14.8 8.9 -1.5 6.4 166 72 4.3
PT -11.2 -107.5 -2.4 -8.6 5.1 0.1 3.3 249 93 10.4
SI -3.0 -35.7 2.3 -5.9 15.7 0.7 1.8 129 39 5.9
SK -4.1 -66.2 12.1 32.6 10.1 -4.9 3.3 69 41 12.0
FI 2.1 9.9 0.3 -18.7 12.3 6.6 6.8 178 48 7.7
3 year average 
of Current 
Account 
Balance
as % of GDP 
% Change
(3 years)
of Real 
Effective 
Exchange Rate 
with HIPC 
deflators
% Change
(5 years)
in Export 
Market 
Shares
Net 
International 
Investment 
Position
as % of GDP
Year 2010
Public Sector 
Debt
as % of GDP
3 year average 
of 
Unemployment
External imbalances and competitiveness Internal imbalances
% y-o-y
change in 
deflated 
House Prices
Private Sector 
Credit Flow
as % of GDP
Private Sector 
Debt
as % of GDP
 % Change
(3 years)
in Nominal 
ULC
 
(1) The shaded cells in the table mark values that fall outside the scoreboard thresholds.  
Source: Commission services 
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Graph I.6: Housing market adjustment by 
Member State, % (1) 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
-50
0
50
100
150
200
PT IT BE FI LU FR ES NL IE
cumulative adjustment (peak to current)
cumulative growth (trough to peak)
average growth (trough to peak, rhs)
 
(1) Programme countries are marked with an asterisk. 
Source: Commission services 
Losses in competitiveness and export market 
shares are also issues that need to be addressed. 
For example, many euro-area countries lost export 
market shares well beyond what would be 
explained by the rapidly increasing competition 
from emerging economies. Some euro-area 
countries, including Cyprus, France, Italy, Finland 
and Belgium, fared worse that the rest of their EU 
peers (Graph I.7). 
Graph I.7: Export market shares by Member 
State, % (1) 
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(1) Programme countries are marked with an asterisk; world 
export market share (00-10) for SK is 108.2 
Source: Commission services 
Finally, the AMR envisaged analytical work in 
the months ahead that would explore this issue 
and serve as a basis for possible policy guidance. 
This analysis will explore the divergence in 
economic performance across Member States, 
including trade and financial interlinkages 
between deficit and surplus countries, and 
examine ways for further rebalancing at the level 
of the euro area and within the global context. It 
will also assess the role played by structural 
factors, including the functioning of services 
markets, through their impact on domestic 
consumption and investment, as a driver of 
sustained surpluses. 
Following its publication, the AMR was discussed 
in the Council, which broadly endorsed the 
proposed list of Member States for which in-depth 
reviews are warranted (6). In the coming months 
and in the context of the European Semester, the 
Commission will prepare in-depth reviews for 
these countries. These reviews will provide 
analysis of the challenges related to 
macroeconomic imbalances in the selected 
countries and pay particular attention to the key 
issues they are facing. In-depth analyses will thus 
help to assess the drivers of productivity, 
competitiveness and trade developments, the 
implications of the accumulated level of 
indebtedness, the adjustment in relative prices, 
including housing prices, and the progress in and 
speed of adjustment in the real economy. If 
corroborated by the findings of the in-depth 
reviews, policy recommendations will be issued to 
Member States under the preventive arm of the 
MIP or the corrective arm will be activated. 
I.7. Conclusions 
The MIP represents a major improvement in the 
economic governance framework in the EU. By 
covering the issue of macroeconomic imbalances, 
it will fill a gap in the surveillance of 
macroeconomic policies. While it is a promising 
tool for improving the coordination of economic 
policies in the EU and the euro area, only the 
effectiveness of implementation can ultimately 
determine its true value. 
As 2012 will be the first year of implementation, 
the process is likely to evolve and develop over 
the years to come. In the case of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, targeted efforts to develop analytical 
approaches and tools have been made over time, 
guided by the requirements of the procedure in a 
learning-by-doing process. The toolkit supporting 
fiscal surveillance is much more advanced today 
than 10 years ago. In this sense surveillance under 
the MIP should also evolve over time and 
ultimately prove to be a useful tool not only in 
this ongoing crisis but also in helping to avoid the 
next.   
 
 
                                                        
(6) See Ecofin conclusions of 13 March 2012 on the first AMR. 
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The contribution of taxes to fiscal consolidation in the euro area 
This section assesses the contribution that taxes could make to ongoing fiscal consolidation processes in the 
euro area. The analysis draws on a set of indicators to identify Member States with a need and room for tax 
increases, bearing in mind that the appropriateness of any tax reform hinges on country-specific factors. In a 
first step, countries are screened for their consolidation needs by focusing on the sustainability of their public 
finances. The second step assesses the availability and extent of ‘tax space’ to address consolidation needs, as 
indicated by a relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio. The ‘tax space’ criterion is further qualified by controlling for 
(i) whether the tax-to-GDP ratio has already risen significantly over the recent past, and (ii) whether there is 
scope for increasing tax categories least detrimental to growth, i.e. mainly consumption and property taxes. 
Based on this mechanical screening for 2011, which does not take into account announced or planned policy 
measures for 2012 and beyond, some euro area Member States appear to have room for higher tax revenues to 
support fiscal consolidation. 
Capital flows into vulnerable countries: official and private funding trends 
Current account disparities among euro-area Member States have been large and persistent since the euro’s 
introduction. Vulnerable euro-area Member States showed comparatively large current account deficits and 
have undergone only partial external rebalancing since the crisis. Continued deficits were financed through 
market-based, decentralised capital flows prior to the crisis. These were then sharply disrupted in late 2008, as 
sovereign and banking sector fears in vulnerable countries caused private investment capital to flee to safe 
havens, including to the ‘core’ euro-area countries. The external financing gap that emerged as a result was 
bridged through liquidity drawn from the Eurosystem, including through TARGET2 claims, and in the later 
stages through EU/IMF loans under financial assistance programmes. In the absence of these backstops 
private capital flight would probably have caused a ‘sudden stop’, with a potentially dramatic impact on 
foreign debt service and domestic consumption and investment. Nevertheless, current account rebalancing 
continues to be necessary, aided by structural reforms and a real internal devaluation. 
The euro-area sovereign CDS market 
Concerns about the potentially aggravating role of credit default swaps (CDS) markets have featured 
prominently in the public debate since the start of the crisis. This special topic attempts to provide a broad and 
accessible overview of developments in the sovereign CDS market. The main conclusions from the analysis are 
that the sovereign CDS market seems to be fairly well structured and functioning, although still maturing. 
While the sovereign CDS market has developed and grown in the past few years, market participants’ 
exposures only pose a limited amount of risk as they are comparatively small. However, transparency is still 
lacking in some aspects of CDS, although this is also true of the sovereign bond market. With the objective of 
increasing transparency and reducing systemic risk arising from derivative markets, the Commission has taken 
several regulatory initiatives, e.g. the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Regulation 
on short selling and certain aspects of CDS. 
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II.1. The contribution of taxes to fiscal 
consolidation in the euro area 
The consequences of the financial and economic 
crisis are deeply reflected in Member States’ 
government revenues. Having implemented a 
wide range of stimulus measures over the period 
2008-10, Member States have clearly shifted 
focus towards much-needed consolidation of 
public finances. While experience from successful 
consolidations suggests that fiscal adjustment 
should primarily come from the expenditure side 
of the budget, (7) some Member States could 
consider raising tax revenues – alongside 
expenditure control – to consolidate public 
finances. This is particularly relevant for countries 
that show unsustainable budgetary situations but, 
at the same time, have room for potential tax 
revenue rises. Research shows that revenue-based 
consolidation is more likely to be successful when 
the initial tax-to-GDP ratio is low. The focus in 
this section is on possible permanent increases in 
tax revenues to safeguard fiscal sustainability, 
rather than on addressing short-term consolidation 
needs through temporary tax hikes. 
When economically justified, the need to increase 
tax revenues might be addressed first by 
improving tax compliance and administration 
rather than by discretionary tax hikes. Where tax 
compliance is already high and/or revenue-raising 
needs cannot be met by enhancing tax compliance 
alone, raising the efficiency of taxation through 
base-broadening measures such as reviewing tax 
breaks and reduced VAT rates should be 
considered. As a last option, lifting tax rates or 
introducing new taxes might be unavoidable in 
some cases. This should, however, be done with a 
view to minimising possible detrimental effects 
on growth. 
Against this background, this section subjects 
euro-area Member States to horizontal 
quantitative screening — against common criteria 
and indicators — to identify scope for tax policy 
measures in the area of fiscal consolidation. The 
methodology used here is presented in more detail 
in the European Commission’s latest report on tax 
reforms in EU Member States. (8) 
                                                        
(7) See European Commission (2010), ‘Public finances in EMU 
— 2010’, European Economy No 4/2010. One major risk 
inherent in tax-side consolidation is that it can create 
disincentives to engage in serious expenditure-based 
consolidation focusing on inefficiency in public spending. 
(8) European Commission (2011), ‘Tax reforms in EU Member 
States 2011 — Tax policy challenges for economic growth 
and fiscal sustainability’, European Economy No 5/2011  
Main screening principles 
The aim of the indicator-based analysis presented 
in this section is to identify general options for 
increasing tax revenues, rather than 
recommending tax increases in any definitive 
way. Against this background and acknowledging 
that country-specific factors and the overall policy 
setting are key elements in gauging the 
appropriateness of any tax reform measures, 
raising tax-to-GDP ratios may be recommendable 
if specific criteria related to consolidation needs 
and the availability of tax space are met. (9) These 
criteria are discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
A sizeable consolidation need 
The first necessary condition is a need for sizeable 
fiscal consolidation, which suggests that, apart 
from reining in expenditure, increasing 
government revenues might be required. This 
potential scope for revenue-raising measures is 
gauged on the basis of the S2 indicator, which is 
part of the family of sustainability gap indicators. 
The sustainability assessment is based on the 
solvency condition for general government 
through its inter-temporal budget constraint. The 
latter is satisfied if the projected outflows of the 
government are covered by the discounted value 
of all future revenue. This is equivalent to saying 
that the government must run sufficiently large 
primary surpluses going forward to cover the cost 
of servicing its debt. It is a long-term concept and 
differs from liquidity, which is concerned with the 
immediate (short-run) ability of a country to issue 
debt to finance its expenditure. 
The S2 indicator shows the permanent adjustment 
to current policies for the structural primary 
balance to fulfil the infinite horizon inter-temporal 
budget constraint, including paying for any 
additional expenditure arising from an ageing 
population. The indicator has two components: 
the ‘initial budgetary position’ component (the 
structural adjustment needed to stabilise debt) and 
the required additional adjustment due to long-
term changes in government expenditure (mostly 
related to ageing). (10) 
                                                                                  
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_
economy/2011/ee5_en.htm). 
(9) See European Commission (2011), op. cit., Box 5.2, for a 
schematic overview of the screening approach. 
(10) The required adjustment given by the initial budgetary 
position is the gap (in % of GDP) between the initial 
structural primary balance and the debt-stabilising primary 
balance (primary balance required to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of public finances under no policy change  
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As such, a high sustainability gap arising 
primarily from an initial budgetary position that is 
insufficient to stabilise debt could be addressed by 
either tax increases or spending cuts. However, 
when combined with a high value of the age-
related component of S2, it points to an additional 
need to substantially reduce public expenditure 
over the medium to longer term which may limit 
the political feasibility and pace of expenditure 
cuts in the short term. Therefore, while the focus 
of the present analysis remains on consolidation 
measures needed in the short to medium term, 
considering both components of S2 is useful in 
order to identify potential needs for raising taxes 
to supplement expenditure control. 
 
Table II.1.1: Tax-to-GDP ratio versus fiscal 
sustainability indicators (1) 
Initial 
Budgetary 
position
Ageing 
component
BE 43.7 5.8 0.7 5.0 0.2 4.7
DE 39.0 4.1 0.6 3.4 1.2 0.7
EE 32.4 1.0 1.5 -0.5 0.0 1.4
IE 28.8 15.5 7.1 8.4 -5.6 2.8
EL 32.5 5.7 3.0 2.7 1.8 -0.1
ES 31.9 8.5 3.2 5.4 -2.7 2.7
FR 43.6 4.4 2.3 2.1 -2.1 0.0
IT 42.3 1.4 -0.1 1.5 1.8 2.3
CY 34.9 8.9 2.9 6.0 -3.5 0.9
LU 38.4 13.3 -0.2 13.5 1.0 2.6
MT 33.5 7.3 1.2 6.1 0.1 -1.5
NL 38.4 7.6 2.4 5.1 -1.3 2.1
AT 42.1 5.6 1.6 3.9 -0.4 1.4
PT 33.0 5.8 2.7 3.0 -2.6 -1.0
SI 38.4 12.5 1.9 10.6 -1.1 -0.4
SK 28.7 6.1 4.3 1.8 -3.4 -2.4
FI 43.3 3.6 -0.8 4.4 1.2 6.1
EA-17 39.5 5.1 1.7 3.4 -0.3 1.4
Tax-to-GDP 
ratio in 
(2011,%)
Country
S2 sustainability gap
indicator (2011, % of GDP)
Primary balance indicators 
(% of GDP)
of which: Average 
primary 
balance 
(2000-07)
Primary 
balance (in 
structural 
terms - 2011)
Total
 
(1) The primary balance is taken from the Commission’s 2011 
autumn forecast. The average primary balance for the years 
2000–07 serves as a pre-crisis benchmark. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The potential need for using taxes to help 
consolidation is assessed on the basis of the two 
components of S2 for 2011, with a particular 
emphasis on the first. It must be noted that the S2 
calculations are based on the Commission's spring 
2011 forecast. They thus provide a snapshot of the 
situation in 2011, assuming unchanged policies 
thereafter. In the case of countries receiving 
financial assistance this means that adjustment 
measures for 2011 are reflected in the calculations 
(but not those for 2012 and beyond) (11) 
                                                                                  
assumptions, i.e. without ageing-related fiscal adjustment). 
See European Commission (2011), Box 5.1 for a more 
detailed presentation of S2. 
(11) The projections are thus conditional on full implementation 
of adjustment measures for 2011. Programme measures for 
2012 and onwards are not taken on board. The pension 
reform in Greece, that was already legislated in spring 2011,  
Regarding the initial budgetary position 
component, a value of over 2.5 pp of GDP is 
considered as significant given the EU and euro-
area averages of 2.2 and 1.7 pp of GDP (see 
Table II.1.1). Regarding the ageing component, a 
value of over 3.5 pp is considered as significant, 
as the EU and euro-area averages stand at 3.2 and 
3.4 pp respectively. Together this leads to a high 
value of at least 6 for the composite sustainability 
gap indicator S2. 
The (structural) primary deficit in 2011 (based on 
the Commission’s autumn 2011 forecast) will be 
used to corroborate the screening results.  
Availability of ‘tax space’ 
The second necessary condition is the availability 
of some ‘tax space’, as approximated by a 
relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio. While using the 
euro area as a natural benchmark, it has to be 
borne in mind that some countries, especially 
those with less advanced economies and less 
developed welfare systems, may require lower tax 
ratios. (12) 
Moreover, given that the impact of a possible tax 
increase on the economy is greatly influenced by 
past developments in the tax-to-GDP ratio and the 
current composition of the tax mix, the ‘tax space’ 
criterion needs to be qualified by controlling for 
the following criteria. 
• Revenue-raising measures have not yet been 
utilised extensively in the recent past, i.e. the 
tax-to-GDP ratio has not risen significantly 
over the past few years due to new 
discretionary measures. 
• The analysis of the tax structure shows that 
there is scope for increasing tax categories 
least detrimental to growth (mainly 
consumption and property taxes). (13) 
                                                                                  
is reflected in the long-term projections, while the Spanish 
pension reform is not. 
(12) A fully informed analysis would clearly need to control for 
the ratio of primary expenditure to GDP, with a particular 
focus on public investment in growth-enhancing areas. 
However, this is beyond the scope of this focus section. 
(13) A high ratio of efficient taxes (i.e. of taxes least detrimental 
to growth) relative to other countries does not by itself imply 
that the ratio could not be increased even further. However, 
in cases where the ratio is low, policy measures to increase 
efficient taxes are likely to entail relatively limited distortions 
and implementation risk, such as leakage effects of VAT 
hikes to neighbouring countries. In that sense the criterion (in 
combination with the availability of overall tax space) is 
sufficient but not strictly necessary. 
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• In addition, low tax-to-GDP ratios 
accompanied by high tax rates are indicative 
of inefficiently narrow tax bases, poor tax 
collection and/or large tax avoidance. In such 
cases, tax revenues could thus be increased 
without resorting to rate hikes, thereby 
minimising distortive effects on economic 
activity. 
Application of screening criteria 
Fiscal sustainability and consolidation needs 
Table II.1.1 and Graph II.1.1 summarise the 
estimates of the S2 indicator and its components, 
based on the Commission services’ spring 2011 
forecast. (14) 
In the graph, the contribution of the initial 
budgetary position to the sustainability gap (in % 
of GDP) is measured on the horizontal axis, while 
the contribution of the projected increase in age-
related expenditure is measured on the vertical 
axis. The value of the S2 indicator can be seen 
from the diagonal ‘iso-gap’ lines. 
Applying the conditions set out above yields three 
euro-area Member States where the sustainability 
gaps are of such an extent and nature that some 
scope for higher tax revenues is indicated with a 
view to addressing the severe consolidation needs: 
                                                        
(14) The output gap is assumed to close by 2015, after which the 
potential growth rates converge linearly to the Ageing 
Working Group baseline scenario by 2020. Beyond 2020, the 
AWG baseline scenario as agreed by the Commission and the 
AWG/EPC is applied. Neither the 2010 pension reform in 
Spain nor the pension reform under way in Italy is reflected 
in the data. 
these are Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Spain (15) 
and Cyprus. These countries are shown in the 
rectangle in the upper right-hand corner of 
Graph II.1.1. Portugal and Greece appear as close 
borderline cases, with initial budgetary positions 
clearly worse but ageing components slightly 
better than the respective thresholds set out above. 
The relatively benign value of 2.7 % of GDP for 
the ageing component of S2 in Greece mirrors the 
effects of the 2010 pension reform. Before the 
adoption of the pension reform the ageing-related 
gap was estimated to be 11.5 % of GDP. 
The Netherlands can also be found on the border 
of the rectangle. With an initial budgetary position 
just below the threshold, the country’s position is 
mainly characterised by high long-term 
projections for ageing-related costs. An exclusive 
focus on the size of the initial budgetary gap 
(regardless of the comparably benign ageing-
related sustainability gap) would place Slovakia 
as a further euro-area country with a significant 
fiscal sustainability gap that might call for policy 
action on the revenue side of the budget. (16) 
In all countries mentioned so far, the overall S2 
value is above, or in the case of Portugal and 
Greece, very close to 6. With overall S2 values 
above 12, the sustainability gaps in Luxembourg 
and Slovenia are of a comparable magnitude to 
that of Ireland. Despite its comparably low initial 
                                                        
(15) The projections underlying the ageing-related component of 
S2 for Spain do not yet include the effects of the 2010 
pension reform (see previous footnote). 
(16) In addition, recent recalculations of S2 based on the 2011 
autumn forecast and updated projections for age-related 
expenditure, to be published in the May 2012 Ageing Report, 
point to a more problematic long-term position for Slovakia. 
Graph II.1.1: Decomposition of the S2 indicator 
BE
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FRIT
CY
LU
MT
NL
AT
PT
SI
SK
FI
EA
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
-14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lo
ng
-te
rm
 co
mp
on
en
t (
%
 o
f G
DP
)
Initial budget position (% of GDP)
Favourable long-term projections
Favourable initial fiscal position Unfavourable initial fiscal position
No sustainability gap
(S2<0)
Sustainability gap
(S2>0)
Unfavourable long-term projections
S2=0 S2=16S2=8S2=4
 
Source: Commission services 
II. Special topics on the euro-area economy 
 
- 21 -
budgetary component of S2, the overall sizeable 
sustainability gap would suggest Slovenia as a 
further country with a potential need for policy 
action on the revenue side of the budget, in 
addition to necessary structural reforms. (17) 
The composition of the gap in Luxembourg 
suggests that the focus of the policy response 
should be placed on structural reforms of social 
protection systems (such as phasing out early 
retirement schemes, and pension and health care 
reforms) rather than tax increases. 
Benchmarking individual countries’ structural 
primary balances (see Table II.1.1) against the 
euro-area average corroborates the findings of the 
screening exercise. For the three countries within 
the above-mentioned rectangle, the structural 
primary deficit shows above-average values, 
particularly for Ireland but also for Cyprus and 
Spain. As to the borderline cases in Graph II.1.1, 
the structural primary deficit is clearly above the 
euro-area average for Slovakia, Portugal and, to a 
lesser extent, Slovenia.(18)  
While the 2011 structural primary deficit for the 
Netherlands is somewhat higher than for Slovenia, 
the Commission's autumn 2011 forecast projects 
the structural primary balance to improve in 2012 
and to turn into a small surplus. The Netherlands 
is therefore not considered to be among the 
countries with significant fiscal sustainability 
challenges that might call for increasing tax 
revenues. 
Availability of tax space 
In terms of tax space, most of the new euro-area 
Member States display tax-to-GDP ratios clearly 
below the euro-area average. Only Slovenia 
displays a tax burden close to the euro-area 
average. Ireland (19), Greece, Spain and Portugal 
also display tax ratios well below the euro-area 
average. Some ‘gross’ potential for raising the 
tax-to-GDP ratio, relative to the euro-area 
average, thus seems to be available in all new 
                                                        
(17) Again, recalculations of S2 (see previous footnote) point to a 
more problematic initial budgetary position for Slovenia. 
(18) According to the Commission’s autumn 2011 forecast, the 
structural primary deficit in 2012 is projected to remain at a 
significant 3 % of GDP in Slovakia, and to increase to 1.7 % 
of GDP in Slovenia. 
(19) The Irish gap with respect to the euro-area average is 
markedly reduced if taxes are computed as a percentage of 
gross national product (GNP), instead of GDP. Nonetheless, 
the ratio remains significantly below the euro-area average. 
In any case GNP is not an ideal denominator for computing 
tax ratios, as it excludes important parts of the tax base (e.g. 
output generated by domestic non-national agents). 
Member States having adopted the common 
currency, with Slovenia being a borderline case, 
and four old Member States (Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal). 
As an additional factor for evaluating the potential 
for raising the tax-to-GDP ratio, tax hikes 
implemented in the recent past need to be taken 
into account. The assessment of the development 
of tax burdens over time should remain cautious, 
given the varying impact of the business cycle on 
tax revenues. Yet, the estimated tax revenue 
elasticity with respect to the output gap is very 
close to unity in almost all Member States. (20) 
Therefore, the ratio of tax revenues to output is in 
principle relatively stable over the cycle (bar the 
impact of tax windfalls and shortfalls generated 
by swings in asset prices). (21) Table II.1.2 
compares the tax-to-GDP ratio in 2011 to that in 
2008 (as a pre-crisis benchmark), to that in 2009 
(as a post-crisis benchmark) and to the ten-year 
average ratio over 2000-2009. It suggests that 
among the countries where tax space appears 
available, tax ratios have not risen significantly 
recently. While tax ratios have rebounded 
markedly from their 2009 lows in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and, to some extent, Ireland, tax ratios in 
2011 were still below or very close to their pre-
crisis levels, and, except for Portugal, also below 
their average values over the past decade. 
The increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio over 2009-
2011 also appears fairly modest in the case of 
Greece, Spain and Ireland compared with the size 
of the total consolidation effort over that period, 
as measured by the change in the primary 
structural balance. Given that substantial policy 
measures such as broadening tax bases and hiking 
tax rates have been put in place in Greece, this tax 
space appears to point in particular to remaining 
severe deficiencies in tax collection and tax 
administration. 
                                                        
(20) The overall elasticity of revenues is estimated at 1.04 for the 
euro area, being an average of the above-unity elasticities for 
personal and corporate taxes, the unit elasticity for indirect 
taxes and the below-unity elasticity for social security 
contributions; see Girouard, N. and C. André (2005), 
‘Measuring cyclically adjusted budget balances for OECD 
countries’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No 434, OECD Publishing. For individual euro-area 
countries the estimates vary between 0.88 for Estonia and 
Slovakia and 1.17 for Italy. 
(21) The results presented in Table II.1.2 and discussed below are 
indeed qualitatively unchanged when the tax-to-GDP ratios 
are cyclically adjusted using the official revenue elasticities 
and output gaps used in the Commission’s fiscal surveillance 
framework. The absolute difference with the actual figures 
presented in the table is on average 0.1 pp and in any event 
no bigger than 0.4 pp. 
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In Portugal, the tax-to-GDP ratio has contributed 
more than half of the consolidation effort so far as 
measured by the change in the structural primary 
balance from 2009 to 2011. 
In Cyprus, where tax space is comparably limited, 
the 2011 tax-to-GDP ratio was only slightly above 
its 2009 low. However, it has increased markedly 
compared to the average over 2000-2009. In 
Slovakia, the country with the lowest tax burden 
in the euro area in 2011, the tax-to-GDP ratio has 
further decreased since 2009. In Slovenia, where 
tax space is very limited, a rising tax burden has 
contributed around one half to the consolidation 
effort over recent years. However, the increase 
over the 2000-2009 average is somewhat more 
limited, in particular when compared to Cyprus. 
A final factor to be taken into account to assess 
the potential for raising tax-to-GDP ratios is the 
structure of the current tax burden. Various 
studies have shown that the composition of the tax 
structure is relevant to growth and that taxes on 
property and consumption (including 
environmental taxes falling on consumption) are 
the least detrimental to growth. Direct taxes, 
namely personal income taxes and corporate 
income taxes, appear to be the most detrimental. 
For a discussion of this ‘tax and growth ranking’ 
see European Commission (2011). 
Where tax categories least detrimental to growth 
still suggest room for increases, raising the overall 
tax burden is likely to be associated with less 
economic distortions and meet less 
implementation risk. In cases where the tax 
burden is relatively low due to e.g. a low tax 
burden on labour, while more growth-friendly tax 
sources are already extensively used, increasing 
the share of labour taxation is not 
recommendable. (22) However, consumption taxes 
might still be raised further where country-
specific circumstances so allow, depending inter 
alia on current VAT rates relative to neighbouring 
countries (leakage effects), the VAT rate 
structure, the efficiency of current VAT 
collection, the share of consumption in GDP and 
tax elasticities. The horizontal screening based on 
macro-indicators of current tax structures can thus 
only deliver first indications of the relative 
feasibility of tapping available overall tax space. 
                                                        
(22) It might be argued that advising against increasing low labour 
tax ratios should logically also imply advising countries with 
high labour tax ratios to reduce them. However, the focus 
here is on addressing consolidation needs. Revenue-neutral 
tax shifts from labour to consumption have been addressed in 
section 5.2 of European Commission (2011). 
 
Table II.1.2: Developments in tax burdens and 
total consolidation efforts 
10y avg to 
2011 2008-11 2009-11 2008-11 2009-11
BE -0.8 -0.4 0.5 -1.5 0.3
DE -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2
EE 1.1 0.7 -3.5 4.5 0.5
IE -1.1 -0.8 0.6 0.3 2.3
EL 0.1 0.3 2.1 6.6 12.0
ES -2.5 -1.1 1.2 0.0 4.0
FR 0.1 0.3 1.5 -1.0 1.7
IT 0.8 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 1.2
CY 2.8 -2.3 0.2 -6.0 0.2
LU 0.8 2.8 0.7 -1.1 -0.6
MT 1.2 -0.4 -0.8 2.3 0.4
NL 0.0 -0.8 0.1 -3.0 0.4
AT -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -1.1 -0.4
PT 1.4 0.2 1.9 -1.1 3.2
SI 0.6 1.2 0.8 2.7 1.6
SK -2.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 3.1
FI -0.9 0.3 0.4 -2.7 -0.5
EA-17 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.6 1.4
Country
Change in tax-to-GDP ratio 
(in pp)
Change in structural primary 
balance 
(in pp of GDP)
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The detailed analysis of tax structures across 
Member States in section 5.2 of European 
Commission (2011) identified the countries with 
relatively low shares of consumption and/or 
(other) indirect taxes. Of the countries discussed 
above in the context of S2, Spain in particular 
appears to have some room for (further) 
increasing the share of consumption and other 
indirect taxes in total tax revenues. The analysis 
of the implicit tax rates on consumption 
underlines the scope for raising consumption 
taxes in Spain, and points to Greece, Portugal and, 
to some extent, Slovakia and Cyprus as further 
countries that could increase consumption 
taxation relative to other euro-area countries. (23) 
All of these additional four countries appear to 
have some overall tax space relative to the euro 
area and have been identified as countries where 
higher tax revenues might be called for to meet 
consolidation needs. 
Based on OECD data on housing taxation for 
2009, there is particular scope for increasing 
taxation on immovable property in several 
countries. (24) Partly overlapping with the 
countries mentioned above as having below-
average shares of revenues from consumption 
and/or indirect taxation in general, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Greece appear as countries with 
relatively low receipts from recurrent real estate 
taxation in a cross-country perspective. In these 
                                                        
(23) While the share of consumption taxes in total tax revenues is 
relatively high in these countries, the actual tax burden that 
falls on consumption is relatively low, reflecting low overall 
tax-to-GDP ratios. 
(24) For a more detailed discussion, see European Commission 
(2011), op. cit. 
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countries, the revenues from recurrent real estate 
taxes account for less than 0.6 % of GDP and 
there is no tax on imputed rents. According to 
updated OECD data for 2010, Portugal would also 
fall into the category of countries with relatively 
low revenues from recurrent property taxes. (25) In 
Ireland, the available tax space is not due to 
relative under-taxation of consumption or other 
indirect tax bases, including property. However, 
as mentioned above, a high share of relatively 
growth-friendly taxes does not preclude 
increasing such taxes further. 
Finally, among the countries discussed above, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain emerge as cases 
where rather low tax-to-GDP ratios go along with 
above-average tax rates on at least two of the 
three main tax bases (personal income, 
consumption (VAT), corporate income). (26) In 
these countries, cutting tax expenditure in direct 
taxation, increasing the efficiency of VAT 
collection and enhancing tax administration would 
thus be preferable to rises in tax rates for 
generating higher revenues at relatively low 
economic costs. (27)   
Summary of screening results 
The mechanical screening analysis presented in 
this section, albeit consistent across countries, is 
inevitably of an essentially macroeconomic 
nature. An in-depth assessment of the 
microeconomic effects of increasing specific 
types of tax, including the specific impact on 
particular groups of taxpayers, would have to be 
carried out before firm tax policy conclusions can 
be drawn. However, such detailed country-
specific scrutiny of the possible room for 
increasing specific categories of taxes lies clearly 
beyond the scope of this section. 
Bearing this caveat in mind and not taking into 
account policy measures implemented or planned 
in 2012 (and beyond), Spain, Ireland and Cyprus 
emerge as countries where the mechanical 
screening analysis suggests scope for potential tax 
increases to support consolidation efforts (Table 
II.1.3). A similar indication applies to the 
borderline cases in terms of the S2 indicator, 
                                                        
(25) OECD (2011), ‘Revenue statistics 1965-2010: 2011 edition’, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. Since the latest available data refer 
to 2010, they do not yet reflect reforms of real estate taxation 
implemented or adopted in 2011. 
(26) Based on statutory (top) tax rates in 2011 compared to the 
arithmetic euro-area average. 
(27) For an in-depth analysis of tax policy challenges related to 
tax expenditure, increasing VAT efficiency and tax 
administration in euro-area countries, see section. 5.3 of 
European Commission (2011), op. cit. 
Portugal and Greece. (28) A focus on the initial 
budgetary component of the sustainability gap 
would point to Slovakia as an additional country 
displaying both the need and scope for raising tax 
revenues. Slovenia could be considered as another 
borderline case. However, the tax space is 
relatively limited, also reflecting some increase in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio in past years. 
 
Table II.1.3: Overview: fiscal consolidation 
challenges (1) 
Country
 Potential need 
for higher tax 
revenues to help 
consolidation 
(based on S2)
'Tax space' 
available 
(compared to EA 
avg)
No significant 
increase in tax-to-
GDP ratio in 
recent years
Scope for 
(further) 
increasing least 
distortionary 
taxes
BE X X
DE (X) X X
EE X X
IE X X X
EL (X) X (X) (X)
ES X X X X
FR X (X)
IT (X) X
CY X X (X)
LU (X) (X) X
MT X X
NL (X) X (X)
AT X
PT (X) X (X) (X)
SI (X) (X) (X)
SK (X) X X X
FI X (X)  
(1) (X) depicts borderline cases, i.e. where the applied criteria 
are either not strictly met (for the S2 criterion), or the assumed 
values remain very close to the thresholds (as for tax space in 
DE, LU, NL, SI), or other indicators not presented in detail in 
this section suggest the need for some qualification. For a 
detailed analysis, see European Commission (2011). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                        
(28) The borderline position for Greece is largely due to the fact 
that the positive effects of the 2010 pension reform are 
reflected in the long-term component of S2. 
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II.2. Capital flows into vulnerable 
countries: official and private funding 
trends 
Introduction 
With regard to the macroeconomic performance 
of the euro area since the beginning of the 
economic and financial crisis, two remarkably 
different perspectives are notable. On the one 
hand, the euro area has shown relative stability in 
terms of the euro's external value and its 
aggregate current account balance with the rest of 
the world. (29) On the other hand, numerous 
Member States witnessed major falls in economic 
output and employment during this period, as well 
as suffering large rises in sovereign financing 
rates on the back of a near-ubiquitous fiscal 
deterioration across the euro area.  
Against this background of the euro area's relative 
external stability in times of such macroeconomic 
upheaval, this section investigates current account 
and financial investment flows in the euro area 
since the start of the crisis. It aims to answer two 
main questions: Given the current account 
imbalances and their nascent correction in the 
euro area, what have been the financial 
counterparts to these current account flows? And 
what role have institutional arrangements in the 
euro area played in supporting current account 
positions and preventing their disorderly 
unwinding? 
Widening of country risk premia 
After years of relatively steady (though divergent) 
growth across euro area Member States, the crisis 
has brought both cyclical and structural 
differences between Member States to the fore. A 
clear reflection of such differences is also found 
in financial markets' pricing of sovereign credit 
risk, following years of near-indiscriminate credit 
risk valuation for advanced economies. 
Graph II.2.1 illustrates this reappraisal using 
sovereign yield spreads over 10-year Bunds, 
showing a remarkable dispersing of implied credit 
risk over a relatively short period of time. The 
depicted risk premia also signify a wider country 
risk divergence that goes well beyond the general 
                                                        
(29) Between September 2008 and February 2012, the euro 
consistently remained within a ±12% fluctuation band from 
its 10-year average (nominal effective basis, 12 partner 
countries), and during the crisis period was on average 3% 
above this long-term average. The quarterly current account 
for the EA-17 fluctuated between +0.7% of GDP and -1.8% 
between 2008 Q4 and 2011 Q3, with a lower standard 
deviation than over the 1999-2008 Q3 period. 
government sector, as fiscal positions, banking 
sector health, and growth prospects became 
increasingly interdependent during the crisis.  
Grouping euro-area Member States according to 
their average sovereign yield spreads since 
between January 2010 and February 2012, three 
main risk groupings are apparent. While 
corresponding to low, medium and high risk 
categories, these are labelled 'core', 'stress' and 
'programme'. (30) The 'stress' group is so named 
due to the acute market stress that affected Italy, 
Spain and Cyprus in the summer of 2011 and that 
has exerted lasting upward pressure on yield 
spreads. These groupings will serve throughout 
the section as focussing concepts for the analysis 
of capital flows, which one can hypothesise to be 
related to macroeconomic (including sovereign) 
risk factors. On occasion a fourth category for 
new euro-area members (Estonia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Malta) will be added for illustration. 
Graph II.2.1: Sovereign yield spreads over 10y 
Bunds, 2010 - Feb '12 monthly mean, pps. 
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Source: EcoWin 
Current accounts showed limited change 
Current account imbalances across Member States 
are one of the principal manifestations of 
macroeconomic heterogeneity within the euro 
area, in particular of the differences in saving and 
investment patterns. Graph II.2.2 shows the 
development of current account balances across 
the four aforementioned groups.  
                                                        
(30) Dividing lines between the three categories are drawn at 
average 10y yield spreads of 200 bps and 500bps respectively 
during the 2010-12 period. 'Core' countries with low average 
yield spreads are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The medium-risk 
'stress' group is so named due to the acute bond market stress 
that affected Italy, Spain and Cyprus in the summer of 2011 
and that has exerted lasting upward pressure on yield spreads. 
It should not come as a surprise that the 'high risk' group 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal) is identical with those countries 
under EU/IMF financial assistance programmes. The 
remaining EA-17 Members (Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Malta) are treated as a separate category. 
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Graph II.2.2: Current account balances 
in euro area, % GDP, 4 quarter moving av. (1) 
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(1) weighted by national GDP; PROG = (EL, PT, IE); STRESS = 
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NEW = (EE, SK, SI, MT) 
Source: Eurostat 
A clear deteriorating trend is evident for both 
'programme' and, to a lesser degree, 'stress' 
countries between 2004 and the outbreak of the 
crisis in late 2008. This was driven by sharp 
declines in real interest rates and capital costs 
which made borrowing and investment relatively 
attractive and led to significant inflows of foreign 
capital to these countries. New euro-area 
Members (accession of whom was not certain for 
much of the pre-crisis period, however) show only 
a limited deficit widening over the period. While 
generally the appearance of (transitory) current 
account deficits is consistent with convergence 
processes at work that channel foreign investment 
into faster-growing economies, new Members 
with the greatest convergence potential 
nonetheless showed comparatively lower – and 
indeed more temporary – current account deficits. 
This underscores the possible misallocation of 
foreign capital to a number of Member States 
including programme countries. (31) 
The crisis marks a turning point for the three 
groups of deficit countries, as current accounts 
improved on average in all three, though much 
more so for new members, who also showed a 
more limited deterioration in the pre-crisis period. 
There are, however differences in the adjustment 
process across countries. While new Member 
States have adjusted significantly by bringing 
domestic saving and investment rates close to 
balance, programme and stress countries still 
show sizable deficits even after several years of 
crisis. The surplus countries of the core (barring 
France) recorded a steadier current account 
                                                        
(31) External rebalancing mechanisms within the euro area are 
examined further in European Commission (2011), "Sectoral 
implications of external rebalancing", Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, Vol.10 No. 3. 
position on average. Overall, the sizeable current 
account deficits run by programme and stress 
countries to date correspond to a continuous need 
for net external funding inflows from other 
countries. 
EU/IMF financial assistance and Eurosystem 
financing as a market surrogate  
By definition, the sum of current account, capital 
account and financial account balance equals zero, 
in the absence of errors and omissions in the 
balance of payments. (32) Capital account balances 
are typically small for advanced economies, 
therefore financial account surpluses are the main 
counterpart to current account deficits. Up until 
the crisis, virtually all financial account flows in 
the euro area consisted of 'market-intermediated' 
flows while virtually no official multilateral 
lending and only limited transfers of central bank 
deposits between Eurosystem members took 
place. Since the Lehman collapse in September 
2008, growing market concerns about solvency 
and liquidity – initially of banks, but increasingly 
of their sovereigns as implicit guarantors - left a 
number of euro-area Member States faced with 
sudden and large withdrawals of private funding 
and an inability to finance themselves at 
affordable interest rates on international capital 
markets.  
Institutional arrangements in the euro area had to 
be adjusted to dampen the impact of a 'sudden 
stop' of foreign capital inflows that might have 
otherwise triggered sovereign defaults and posed 
a risk of contagion for the euro area as a whole. 
This initially included temporary facilities such as 
the Greek loan facility, the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Facility) and the EFSM 
(European Financial Stability Mechanism). 
Greece (starting in May 2010), Ireland (January 
2011) and Portugal (May 2011) have drawn 
external funding from these facilities. The 
programmes were designed by the European 
Commission and IMF, in liaison with the ECB, to 
cover financing needs and to address country-
specific vulnerabilities of the Member States 
concerned in the structural, fiscal and financial 
domain. The European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the permanent rescue fund with an 
                                                        
(32) An economy's balance of payments measures economic 
transactions between residents and the rest of the world, and 
is divided into three principal accounts: The current account, 
(measuring goods and services trade, investment income and 
current transfers), the capital account (transfers of fixed 
assets and debt cancellations) and the financial account 
(transactions in financial assets and liabilities).  
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effective lending volume of €500bn, will be 
operational in mid-2012. (33)  
Moreover, banking sectors in the euro area have 
benefited from the liquidity-providing operations 
by the Eurosystem. Euro-area membership 
implies that banking sectors in Member States can 
obtain funding via national central banks at the 
current ECB refinancing rate. During the crisis, 
the provision of liquidity was expanded by the 
ECB through a number of operative measures in 
order for monetary policy objectives to be 
achieved in the challenging economic and 
financial environment. For instance, full allotment 
at the policy rate was offered under main as well 
as long-term refinancing operations. 
Requirements for participating in the 
Eurosystem's collateralised operations were 
lowered, while at the same time certain safeguards 
such as larger collateral margins were applied to 
protect the ECB's balance sheet. In addition, some 
National Central Banks (NCBs) had to provide 
emergency liquidity assistance. As a result, euro-
area banks could cover a larger share of their 
financing needs through refinancing operations 
with the Eurosystem, instead of market funding. 
These institutional adjustments to the economic 
policy arrangements in the euro area allowed the 
public sector to offset a large part of private 
foreign funding outflows and thereby also allowed 
for the continued financing of trade flows within 
the euro area. Graph II.2.4 illustrates this for the 
three programme countries, where current account 
deficits were among the highest in the euro area 
and the crisis has had the largest impact on 
external financing flows.  
In all three countries current account deficits were 
in the pre-crisis period almost exclusively covered 
through 'private' financial flows, without 
involving major multilateral lending or creating 
significant net asset or liability positions of NCB's 
vis-à-vis the Eurosystem. When the first ripples of 
financial turmoil originating in the US began 
affecting European banks in early 2008, an 
outflow of private funding set in that accelerated 
until 2010. Liquidity provided by  the Eurosystem 
was transferred through the so-called 'TARGET2' 
payments system to offset these outflows of 
                                                        
(33) From a balance of payments perspective, EU-IMF financial 
assistance programmes are loans from non-residents to 
national governments (even if the government uses it to 
support domestic banks), which appear in the financial 
account of the BoP as a liability under 'other investment', 
which comprises foreign loans and deposits. 
private funding.(34) The continued net external 
financing need represented by the current account 
deficits of the three countries was therefore 
initially also largely covered by such transfers of 
central bank liquidity. By contrast, official 
lending related to EU/IMF financial assistance 
programmes  only became effective at  a later 
stage, although as of the third quarter of 2011 it 
has now become the (near-)dominant source of 
external financing for the programme countries. 
TARGET2 balances as an indicator of severe 
funding strains  
Prior to the crisis the net TARGET2 balance of 
any given NCB vis-à-vis the Eurosystem was 
relatively small, as depicted in Graph II.2.3. Since 
2008 these balances have risen very sharply, in 
the case of Germany, Netherlands and Finland 
amounting to some €700bn at end-2011.  
Graph II.2.3: Net TARGET2 Balances in 
Eurosystem, % of national GDP 
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(1) Positive figures indicate a net asset position vis-à-vis the 
Eurosystem. TARGET2 balances proxied by monetary 
authorities' international investment positions (IIP) in the 'loans 
and deposits' division of Other Investment, see also note (2) of 
Graph II.2.4.  
Source: Commission services 
The counterpart to these large absolute net asset 
positions is a large combined net liability position 
                                                        
(34) The Eurosystem's 'TARGET2' system is an integrated 
payment platform that records and manages all cross-border 
transfers of Central Bank liquidity between two countries in 
the Eurosystem. Any cross-border payment between banks in 
two euro area MS through the TARGET2 system thus 
automatically generates balancing credit claims between the 
national central bank and the ECB. If a national central bank 
is a net claimant from these payments, the claim appears as 
an asset on its own balance sheet under the entry “other 
claims within the Eurosystem”. If a NCB has made net 
outgoing payments to another NCB, it shows up as a liability 
on its balance sheet under the entry “other liabilities within 
the Eurosystem”. The accumulated claims and liabilities 
impact on the International Investment Position, their 
(transactional) changes are recorded in the balance of 
payment in the category "other investment". An increase in a 
Member State's net liabilities to the Eurosystem is therefore 
recorded as a net inflow of capital. 
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of the programme countries and of Italy and 
Spain. Relative to these countries' economic 
output, net TARGET liabilities have been very 
large only in the case of the programme countries, 
in Ireland even reaching 100% of GDP at end-
2010. Germany's total TARGET assets equate to a 
more moderate – though undoubtedly significant 
– 17% of GDP at Q3 2011, with Finland and the 
Netherlands showing similar net asset positions. 
TARGET balances were low prior to the crisis 
because private financing for, say,  import-related 
payments was on aggregate provided by non-
resident investors generating mutually-offsetting 
liquidity flows within the system. (35) However, 
the massive withdrawal of such foreign funding 
during the crisis period resulted in largely one-
way flows through the TARGET system, meaning 
that growing net TARGET liabilities are 
accumulated by the NCBs of countries 
experiencing severe financial market tensions. 
This underscores the inextricable links between 
the financial systems of Eurosystem Member 
States that euro-area membership entails, and that 
                                                        
(35) In TARGET2, the cross-border payment for e.g. a foreign car 
purchase by an Italian resident from a German manufacturer 
would lead to a claim of the German Bundesbank on the 
Banca d'Italia, which would then be transferred onto the 
Eurosystem's books and generate an asset for the Bundesbank 
vis-à-vis the Eurosystem. A corresponding loan of a German 
bank (or any other foreign entity) to the Italian buyer would 
involve a transfer sent the other way, thus creating a claim of 
the Italian CB on the BB, and so on to the Eurosystem. 
can absorb the potentially severe macroeconomic 
consequences associated with sudden capital flow 
reversals. 
Sudden withdrawal of private funding reverses 
years of strong inflows 
Graph II.2.5 illustrates the impact of these three 
types of funding flows on Member States' net 
international investment position by 
approximating net foreign assets based on private 
funding flows as all those net external financial 
assets that result neither from: a) changes in 
monetary authority’s net international investment 
position in other investments (largely driven by 
TARGET2 balances), nor b) from official 
programme-related lending. It reveals that a 
sizeable part of the net foreign liability positions 
of the programme countries is now represented by 
net liabilities of their monetary authorities and 
official programme-related borrowing by 
governments. Shares vary between countries, 
from around half of net external liabilities to the 
entirety of Ireland's net foreign debt stock. 
Though arguably vulnerable in other respects, 
Spain and Italy remain predominantly market-
financed in net terms. The net foreign creditors 
Germany and the Netherlands hold sizeable net 
TARGET assets, although private assets are still 
dominant. 
Graph II.2.4: Balance-of-payments developments in Programme countries, 4 quarter moving av., % GDP 
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(1) Positive figures signify net inflows of capital for all categories except the current account, where a positive figure denotes a current 
account surplus. The three components of "programme financing", "change in TARGET balances" and "private financial flows" do not 
always sum to the current account balance due to errors and omissions in the balance of payments, which can be large.
(2) The variable "change in TARGET balances" is defined as the annual change in a country's net position in the International investment 
position (IIP) for "other investment position in loans and deposits of the monetary authority". While this category almost exclusively 
captures positions in the TARGET2 system vis-à-vis the Eurosystem, it is a slightly wider definition than the TARGET balances alone that 
have been quoted in the associated public debate. Using the aforementioned official IIP category ensures that other non-TARGET liquidity 
transfers are also captured and ensures data consistency across countries. "Private financial flows" are defined as a residual in the following 
way: Financial account + capital account – Programme finance – change in TARGET balance = private financial flows. It includes some 
transactions that can be considered as official and/or multilateral financing flows, such as EU funds and budget contributions. Such 
transactions are typically stable and relatively small compared to programme and TARGET funding since the crisis.  
Source: Commission services 
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Graph II.2.5: Net foreign asset position: 
breakdown by type of funding, end-Q3 2011, % 
GDP (1) 
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
NL DE FI FR IT ES EL IE PT
Programme funding
Net TARGET Balance
Net Foreign assets from private capital flows
 
 
(1) Positive values indicate a net asset position vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. Programme lending only includes completed 
disbursements up to 30 September 2011. Programme funding 
only shown for recipient countries, as large parts of programme 
lending are funded via the EFSF/EFSM, which represents a 
contingent liability for creditor Member States. Net TARGET 
Balances as defined in note (2) of Graph II.2.4. 
Source: Commission services 
The sudden and sharp reversal of private capital 
flows to programme countries that was offset by 
an increase in public sector liabilities represents a 
sharp reversal of previous trends. Graph II.2.6 
shows cumulative private capital flows by group 
of country,  indicating that pre-crisis inflows were 
strongest in relative terms for programme 
countries and new members, although only in the 
former group the flows reversed significantly. 
Some slowing of private capital flows trends is 
evident for the stress group, while core countries 
are beginning to repatriate private capital in net 
terms.  
Graph II.2.6: Cumulative net private capital 
inflows, % GDP (1) 
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(1) Weighted by national GDP; 2004 Q3 as starting point. For 
definitions of country groupings see notes to Graph 2. 
Source: Commission services 
Components of capital flight 
Further insights into the nature of this private 
capital flight from vulnerable countries can be 
gained by looking at a breakdown of the major 
financial account categories, which are 'other 
investment', 'portfolio investment' (split into debt 
and equity instruments), and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Graph II.2.7 presents financial 
account flows before and since the crisis 
according to these categories.  
Ireland is excluded from the group of programme 
countries, as its financial account flows in 2010 
Q4 were majorly distorted by large transactions of 
IFSC banks to a euro-area government-sponsored 
special purpose vehicle as part of its EU/IMF 
adjustment programme. This quasi-debt-equity 
swap contributed to a fall of Irish banks' foreign 
loan and deposit liabilities of €160bn (107% 
GDP) over the quarter, partly counterbalanced by 
a rise in portfolio equity liabilities of € 111bn 
(75% GDP).  
From an economic point of view the exclusion of 
Ireland for this reason does not detract from 
overall dynamics in the programme countries, as 
Ireland's total net financial flows in the particular 
quarter were affected much less by the 
aforementioned swap, and because all three 
programme countries show broadly similar 
external financing trends otherwise. More 
generally, financial account flows show a 
changing risk appreciation between the various 
country groups in all sub-components, to an 
almost surprising degree. 
Other investment comprises loans and deposit 
liabilities and assets of both public and private 
sector entities. Although typically a private-
sector-dominated asset class, both TARGET2 
balances and EU/IMF programme-related lending 
are captured in this category. Given the 
aforementioned crisis developments, other 
investment represents the most dynamic of asset 
classes since the start of the crisis. Previously, 
both programme and stress countries were net 
recipients of other investment to a moderate 
extent, but since then net inflows of other 
investment have massively risen, due mainly to a 
combination of growing TARGET2 balances and 
official programme-related government funding. 
By contrast, core countries increased their net 
financial outflows through other investment, again 
due to these two factors.  
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Overall, closer inspection of non-public sector 
loan and deposit holdings shows comparatively 
limited movements, notably in banks' foreign loan 
and deposit liabilities. This suggests that gross 
reductions in foreign liabilities (caused e.g. by the 
foreign counterparty selling the asset) were not 
systematically large, in particular not for 
programme countries. (36) Instead, the rise in 
'other investment' financing has allowed portfolio 
investment into programme countries to fall from 
significantly positive territory prior to the crisis to 
near-zero since then.  
Debt securities represent the second-largest item 
in net financial account flows, and here too a 
significant shift in financing trends is apparent 
that differs according to levels of country risk. 
While in the pre-crisis period programme and 
stress countries were externally financed 
predominantly through net issuance of debt 
securities, net inflows have entirely dried up for 
programme countries and have halved for the 
stress group. (37) By contrast, the large and stable 
                                                        
(36) Only CY and IE (not shown) recorded major movements in 
foreign bank deposits, and in these cases intra-company 
financing (CY) and a major debt/equity swap via an SPV (IE) 
played a role, rather than lending dynamics with third parties. 
(37) For programme countries sovereign debt held by foreigners 
has indeed fallen outright, as programme funding has mainly  
security markets in the core group acted as a safe 
haven and attracted far stronger portfolio debt 
inflows than before the crisis, especially into 
France.  
Equity securities funding from abroad shows 
some shifts since the crisis, though only in 
programme countries, where net foreign 
acquisitions of shares are now around zero. 
Compared to the pre-crisis period, this reflects a 
considerable drop, which is likely to be linked to 
the impact of a weak growth outlook and large 
macroeconomic risks on corporate profitability.   
Finally, FDI flows have shown a rather more 
limited response to crisis developments, with 
programme countries showing only a minor 
increase in net FDI receipts, from pre-crisis net 
flows of zero on average. Economies in the core 
and stress groups have still acted as a source of 
FDI into other countries since the crisis, as is to be 
expected on the basis of their higher relative 
income levels.  
                                                                                  
financed the redemption of maturing sovereign bonds. 
Continued investment by foreigners in private sector debt 
instruments has partly offset the net contraction in external 
sovereign debt. 
Graph II.2.7: Average financial account flows, quarterly, % of GDP 
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(1) Weighted by national GDP; for country groupings see notes to Graph II.2.2; N.B: PROG group excludes Ireland. 
Source: Eurostat 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2012 
 
- 30 -
Conclusion  
Following the introduction of the euro, external 
borrowing by several euro area Member States 
increased sharply, forming the counterpart to large 
current account deficits and a rapid deterioration 
in these countries net external indebtedness. The 
boom in foreign capital inflows was then sharply 
disrupted by the current crisis as investment 
capital sought a safe haven in the 'core' euro area 
countries. This reversal of cross-border financing 
flows can be observed in all asset categories, it is 
however particularly pronounced for other as well 
as portfolio investment.  
Given the size of the private funding withdrawal 
from peripheral euro-area Member states, the 
current account adjustment has so far been rather 
limited in most cases: funding through loans 
related to EU-IMF assistance programmes 
together with expansion of liquidity-providing-
operations conducted by the Eurosystem acted as  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a stop-gap and prevented a disorderly adjustment 
in the current account. This allowed for 
consumption and investment in several Member 
States to be sustained at levels that would not 
have been feasible otherwise. In the absence of 
crisis-related measures taken by EU and euro-area 
institutions, several euro-area Member States 
would have likely faced a very disruptive 
adjustment, including widespread defaults on their 
external liabilities.  
Nevertheless, external rebalancing remains an 
important policy aim so as to ensure external debt 
sustainability. The return of the current account to 
balance will involve structural reforms and a real 
effective depreciation, which is reflected in the 
policy conditionality attached to official financial 
assistance programmes. Without such an 
adjustment, macroeconomic imbalances and the 
vulnerability to capital withdrawal will ultimately 
persist. 
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II.3. The euro-area sovereign CDS 
market 
The sovereign debt crisis is now in its third year. 
Already at an early stage of the crisis, concerns 
were raised about the possibly aggravating role of 
the market for credit default swaps (CDS). This 
special topic attempts to provide a broad and 
accessible view of developments in the sovereign 
CDS market. It also discusses some critical issues 
related to the CDS market. 
CDS and their use 
Credit default swaps are financial instruments that 
allow credit risk to be taken or transferred from 
one party to another. (38) Credit risk arises from 
the possibility of default on a pre-agreed payment, 
and the purchase of a CDS contract pays off when 
such a payment default occurs, thereby shifting 
the risk to the seller of the CDS. CDS markets are 
therefore important vehicles for reallocating risks 
on financial markets. 
Sovereign CDS can be used for many different 
purposes. For example, they can be used to hedge 
an existing government bond position, or other 
exposures with a high sovereign correlation 
(‘proxy hedging’), against losses from potential 
deterioration of the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. They can also be used to take an 
exposure to sovereign risk and receive a return in 
exchange for the credit risk assumed, or be used 
as trading tools for exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities in government bond markets. Other 
fields of application are portfolio and regulatory 
capital management. In addition, sovereign CDS 
are a standardised instrument for studying and 
comparing credit risk across countries. 
The general terms of a CDS contract are laid 
down in standard documents, most often as 
proposed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). For such 
contracts, the ISDA Credit Derivative 
Determination Committee determines whether a 
credit event (39) has occurred. The Committee has 
                                                        
(38) Credit default swaps are over-the-counter (OTC) products 
and are quoted in basis points per year — the so called CDS 
spread. The CDS spread indicates the cost per year to either 
buy or sell exposure to the possibility of default or 
restructuring of an underlying debt security. Thus, a buyer of 
a CDS contract incurs a yearly cost, an ‘insurance’ premium 
to be paid, to hold the contract. 
(39) A sovereign CDS contract can be triggered when a credit 
event occurs. There are basically three credit events for 
sovereign CDS:  
to reach a qualified majority of 80 % to resolve a 
Credit Event Request Resolution (a request for 
determining whether a credit event has occurred). 
The Determination Committee consists of market 
participants termed ‘voting dealers’ (10), 
‘consultative dealers’ (2), and ‘voting non-
dealers’ (5). 
In the event of a default, an investor who has 
bought a CDS contract is entitled to receive a 
payment equivalent to the face value of the bond, 
less any amount recovered from the bond 
obligation. There are two ways of settling a CDS 
contract in the event of default. One involves the 
physical delivery of bonds in exchange for money 
and is termed physical settlement. The other 
involves only the transfer of cash and is called 
cash settlement.(40)  
Following the exercise by Greece of collective 
action clauses to amend the terms of Greek 
government bonds, the Determination Committee 
unanimously resolved that a restructuring credit 
event occurred on 9 March 2012. The second 
financial assistance programme for Greece 
included a condition regarding private sector 
involvement that would allow Greece to bring its 
debt level down to a sustainable level. The 
exchange of old bond holdings for new bonds at a 
lower value was initially voluntary. Creditors 
holding more than 85 % of the value of Greek 
bonds participated. However, to increase 
participation, Greece introduced and then 
triggered collective action clauses. As a result, 
this constituted a credit event. 
CDS position trends 
Since the beginning of 2009, the gross notional 
value for CDS contracts written for euro-area 
Member States has been trending upward. 
Notional values represent the par amount of credit 
protection bought or sold, and gross notional 
values are the sum of CDS contracts bought or 
                                                                                  
1. Failure to pay — a sovereign fails to make a payment under 
one or more obligations, where a grace period for payment is 
taken into account. 
2. Restructuring — a sovereign changes the terms of the 
relevant obligation, which makes it less favourable to the 
holders. These events include a reduction in the principal 
amount or interest payable, a postponement of payment, and 
a change in ranking in priority of payment. 
3. Repudiation/moratorium — a sovereign refuses to honour its 
obligations and declares a moratorium and acts accordingly. 
This particular credit event will only trigger payment under 
the CDS contract if it is accompanied by an actual failure to 
pay or by a restructuring. 
(40) In case of a major credit event that is followed by an auction 
all contracts tend to be cash settled. 
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equivalently sold. (41) The number of contracts 
has increased in parallel (see Graph II.3.1). Both 
indicators provide information on the activity 
taking place. However, the gross notional value 
overstates the level of new activity because it 
represents a cumulative total of past transactions, 
many of which were used by dealers to make their 
daily adjustments to their risk positions. 
Furthermore, they do not represent an overall 
measure of the exposures involved. 
Graph II.3.1: Outstanding credit protection for 
euro-area Member States — gross notional 
amounts and number of contracts 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
2009 2010 2011 2012
ThousandBi
llio
n e
ur
o
Euro area - gross (lhs)
Euro area - number of contracts (rhs)
 
Source: Commission services 
The increases in the net notional values in 
Member States’ CDS have levelled off for the 
euro-area aggregate since the beginning of 2010 
(see Graph II.3.2). Net notional positions 
generally represent the maximum possible net 
funds transfers between sellers of protection and 
buyers of protection that could be required upon 
the occurrence of a credit event. Actual net funds 
transfers are dependent on the recovery rate for 
the underlying bonds or other debt instruments. 
The net notional value is a measure of the 
exposures and thus the risks involved – under the 
condition that each counterparty fulfils the 
obligations under the contract as regards the 
country in question. 
Trading in Member States’ CDS and the 
increasing number of contracts has produced no 
                                                        
(41) In a market with three parties trading CDS contracts of the 
same reference entity, i.e. the same country, A has sold 
protection for EUR 100 million and bought protection for 
EUR 50 million; B has sold EUR 200 million and bought 
EUR 200 million; and C has only bought EUR 50 million. 
The gross notional amount is then the sum of outstanding 
amounts (either sold or bought), which is EUR 300 million. 
The net notional amount is the sum of the individual net 
positions, where A has sold a net amount of protection of 
EUR 50 million, B has a zero net position, and C has bought 
a net amount of EUR 50 million. The net notional amount is 
then the sum of outstanding net positions (either sold or 
bought), which is EUR 50 million. 
effect on overall exposures. Market participants 
may enter into new transactions both for assuming 
new exposures and for closing old positions. The 
main way for market participants to close a 
position is for one party to enter into an offsetting 
transaction, which leaves the original transaction 
in place, but effectively cancels out its economic 
effect. (42) Both types of trade have added to the 
gross notional value and the number of 
outstanding contracts but net exposures have 
remained broadly stable. The sharp drops that 
occur at specific dates in the gross notional value 
and the number of contracts are due to trade 
compression, i.e. in order to reduce counterparty 
risks, the trade repository Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) organises bilateral 
and multilateral tear-ups (see footnote 41). 
Graph II.3.2: Outstanding credit protection for 
euro-area Member States — net notional 
amounts 
(billion euros) 
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The aggregate figures hide differences among 
Member States. Trading in CDS and the 
increasing number of contracts for the programme 
countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal has mainly 
reduced CDS exposures towards these countries 
in recent years. The net notional values in CDS 
for the programme countries Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal have declined by between 35 % and 62 % 
since February 2010. Also, the net notional value 
in Italian CDS has declined by almost 30 % since 
December 2010. The decline in the net notional 
position in conjunction with the increase in the 
gross notional position and the number of 
contracts imply that new contracts have been 
traded in order to close out old positions. For 
                                                        
(42) There are two other ways to close a position: (i) the parties 
can agree to a termination (or tear-up), under which they 
agree to extinguish the original obligation following 
payment, or (ii) a party can enter into a novation, also known 
as an assignment, under which it transfers its rights and 
obligations under the transaction to a third party in exchange 
for a payment. 
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other Member States, e.g. France, Germany, Spain 
and the UK, trading has implied that market 
participants have increased their direct exposures 
via CDS contracts. However, it is impossible to 
say whether these CDS positions are used for 
hedging purposes or are of a speculative nature. 
Graph II.3.3: Outstanding credit protection for 
individual Member States — gross notional 
amounts 
(billion euros) 
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Graph II.3.4: Outstanding credit protection for 
individual Member States — net notional 
amount 
(billion euros) 
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Source: Commission services 
CDS exposures 
The following analysis is based on non–public 
information from summer 2011. The data supplied 
contain both detailed and aggregate information 
on individual firms’ positions in euro-area 
sovereign CDS. The data provide an instantaneous 
picture of the stock of all positions and exposures 
at the time of the request. Although the data are 
outdated, they provide interesting information on 
the holdings of CDS. 
Market participants’ total net exposures towards 
16 euro-area Member States’ CDS (all except 
Luxembourg) are in general small. More than two 
thirds of all net exposures lie in the interval EUR 
-100 to +100 million (a minus sign means that the 
institution is a net seller of protection, see 
Graph II.3.5). In the dataset, the biggest net 
protection buyer has a total position of around 
EUR 8 billion and the biggest net protection seller 
a position of EUR 12 billion. Besides a few major 
investment funds, the institutions with the largest 
net exposures are among the biggest banks in the 
world and act as market makers in CDS contracts. 
The median net protection buyer (the median of 
all positive exposures in the distribution, the right 
tail) and the median net protection seller (the 
median of all negative exposures, the left tail) 
have positions of EUR 36 and 58 million 
respectively. In relation to the total face value of 
outstanding sovereign debt (about EUR 7 800 
billion), these net exposures are very small. 
Graph II.3.5: Distribution of individual market 
participants’ aggregate net notional positions vis-
à-vis euro-area sovereign debt 
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Source: Commission services 
CDS exposures for any specific reference entity 
(i.e. for any single Member State) are significantly 
smaller. More than 70 % of the exposures lie in 
the interval EUR -50 to +50 million, and the 
median net protection buyer and the median net 
protection seller have positions of EUR 20 and 
27 million respectively. For all Member States, 
the size of the CDS market and the exposures 
related to it are small compared to those of the 
underlying sovereign debt market. 
In the dataset firms are differentiated by the term 
‘dealer’ (big banks acting as market makers) and 
‘buyside’ (smaller banks, banks less involved in 
CDS and investment firms of different kinds). 
Both types of firms are represented in the two tails 
of the distribution in Graph II.3.5. 
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The dealers in the tails of the distribution are 
some of the biggest banks in the world, acting as 
market makers in CDS. These institutions act on 
both sides of the market and have large amounts 
of both bought and sold contracts. Their biggest 
individual exposures are in general vis-à-vis other 
dealers. It is likely — but not certain — that these 
exposures represent offsetting deals in order to 
manage market and counterparty risks. Moreover, 
the net exposures that CDS represent in terms of 
total assets managed by these firms are tiny. 
Alongside the dealers, a set of (hedge) funds take 
active positions in CDS. These firms hold 
relatively few contracts and mainly take one-sided 
bets, although there are firms on both sides of the 
market — protection buyers and protection 
sellers. It is not possible to say whether these 
positions are ‘speculative’ or serve another 
purpose. Without data on the holdings of each 
fund, it is impossible to indicate the purpose of 
these CDS positions. Besides being purely 
speculative, the CDS positions may be held for 
hedging purposes, e.g. reducing single exposures 
to sovereign or corporate bonds. They may also 
serve as instruments in more complex, maybe 
even dynamic, investment strategies targeting 
risks other than sovereign risk. CDS contracts 
may also have been used to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities. 
Consistent pricing, rating and absence of 
arbitrage 
A first consistency test of the CDS market is to 
compare the theoretical implied prices with the 
ones established on the market. As a default swap 
is a derivative product, its price can be 
theoretically derived through a no-arbitrage 
argument under the assumption that markets are 
connected without frictions. It is possible to 
derive several different arbitrage conditions, i.e. 
different pricing formulas. For example, the yield 
to maturity minus the risk-free yield constitutes an 
upper bound for the CDS spread. (43) 
                                                        
(43) By forming a portfolio of a bond and the credit default swap 
for the same entity, an investor can eliminate most of the 
risks associated with default on the bond. Approximately, if y 
is the yield to maturity on the bond and s is the CDS spread, 
the net annual return on the portfolio is y–s, i.e. the yield 
minus the hedging cost. In the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities, this should be approximately equal to the risk-
free yield, rf. The CDS spread s can thus be estimated to be 
equal to y-rf. To reach this conclusion, several simplifying 
assumptions have to be made, e.g. that the recovery rate of a 
defaulted bond is zero. A proper valuation of the CDS spread 
requires an estimate of the risk-neutral probability that the 
underlying bond will default at different future times and an 
estimate of the expected recovery rate in the event of default.  
To avoid having to decide what risk-free rate to 
use, the arbitrage condition can be specified 
relative to another country. In Graph II.3.6, CDS 
spreads and the bond yields for the five-year 
maturity are plotted for 11 euro-area Member 
States relative to German spreads and yields. The 
45-degree line constitutes the upper bound for 
what the CDS spread should be. As long as the 
points are below the 45-degree line there is no 
evidence of any obvious mispricing. However, 
this representation of the market does not rule out 
the possibility of prices being manipulated; it just 
suggests that prices are contained within the 
theoretical bounds. 
Graph II.3.6: Five-year CDS spreads and five-
year benchmark bond yields relative to Germany
(averages Jan. 2010–Dec. 2011) 
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The CDS spreads are within or very close to the 
no-arbitrage bounds. The spreads and the yields 
are calculated as averages over a period stretching 
from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2011. 
Thus the chart gives a medium-term perspective 
of the relationship. Overall, the picture is not 
changed by altering this time period. Regarding 
Member States that are not subject to acute 
financial stress, only France lies above the 45-
degree line by a few basis points, which is too 
costly to exploit. A divergence from the arbitrage 
bound can be explained by recognising that 
Germany is not necessarily the best benchmark to 
substitute for the risk-free rate. In this case some 
countries could end up above the 45-degree line. 
Graph II.3.6 also shows that CDS spreads for the 
more troubled countries are relatively cheap 
compared to the bond spreads. This is a first 
                                                                                  
The simple case, where s = y-rf, is an approximation of the 
true spread and constitutes an upper bound for the spread, 
thus the relationship does not hold with equality. Another 
example of an arbitrage condition is what is termed the CDS-
bond basis, which is the difference between the yield and the 
asset swap spread. 
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indication that CDS spreads cannot be considered 
as causing the high bond yields for these 
countries, which was a concern at the onset of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This finding is consistent 
with sufficient supply of hedging being offered 
for troubled countries and speculators acting as 
hedging (liquidity) providers at a time of distress. 
This could be considered to be beneficial for the 
cost of funding sovereign deficits, because the 
hedging provided allows institutional investors to 
take on more debt, and thus keeps the yields for 
troubled countries lower than would otherwise be 
possible. From this perspective the CDS market 
seems to facilitate risk sharing. 
Graph II.3.7: Average CDS spreads in 2011Q4 for 
individual Member States according to credit 
rating 
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In general, CDS spreads are clustered and aligned 
according to the entities’ rating (see Graph II.3.7), 
i.e. participants on the CDS market and credit 
rating agencies form consistent opinions 
concerning Member States’ credit risk. In fact, the 
CDS spreads and ratings are very consistent with 
each other. The distribution for each rating 
category becomes wider as creditworthiness falls, 
implying that Member States with a higher credit 
rating are more homogenous in their economic 
performance than Member States in lower rating 
categories. For the lower rating categories the 
distribution of CDS spreads overlap somewhat, 
indicating that there is some ambiguity 
concerning which rating category some Member 
States should be in. 
Market linkages, price discovery, and market 
microstructure 
The Commission has previously studied several 
other issues concerning sovereign CDS and bond 
markets, e.g. market linkages, price discovery, 
and market microstructure. Sometimes the 
approach has been broad and in other cases the 
focus has been narrower, e.g. on one Member 
State or a particular sector. The following is a 
summary of selected findings. 
Market linkages. To explore the links between 
the CDS and the bond market one can analyse the 
cross-correlations between changes in the CDS 
spread and changes in the asset-swap spread. (44) 
These correlations show that the two markets are 
moving close together. The vast majority of 
countries show no lead or lag behaviour, and 
when the series are not changing 
contemporaneously, CDS and bond markets are 
basically equally likely to lead or lag the other. 
Price discovery. Analysis based on Greek data 
shows that credit risk price discovery also seems 
to occur on both markets simultaneously. One of 
the most important functions of financial markets 
is price discovery, which is the process whereby 
buyers and sellers arrive at a transaction price. 
Because buyers and sellers discover prices on the 
basis of uncertain expectations, transaction prices 
fluctuate around the ‘true’ market price. Both the 
bond and the CDS markets price credit risk 
equally on average, as demonstrated by the 
stationary CDS-bond basis. This long-term 
relationship justifies the use of a vector error 
correction model when analysing the 
interconnection between the two markets. (45) The 
                                                        
(44) Both the CDS spread and the asset-swap spread are measures 
of credit risk, where the asset-swap spread is considered to be 
priced on the bond market. The asset-swap spread is the 
difference between the yield of a bond and the LIBOR rate, 
expressed in basis points. The asset-swap spread is designed 
to show the credit risk associated with the bond. The 
difference between the CDS and the asset-swap spreads is 
another arbitrage condition called the CDS-bond basis. In 
principle the basis should be zero. 
(45) A formal test of the equivalence of the price of credit risk 
across the CDS and the bond market can be motivated in 
terms of transitory and permanent price movements. If the 
two markets price credit risk equally in the long run, their 
prices should be cointegrated, suggesting a stationary basis. 
The CDS price and the asset swap spread for Greece are 
cointegrated I(1) variables and the common factor can be 
viewed as the implicit efficient price of credit risk. To see 
which of the two markets contributes most to the credit risk 
price discovery process, it is necessary first to estimate the 
following vector error correction model: ( )
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If the bond market is contributing significantly to the 
discovery of the price of credit risk, then 1λ  will be negative 
and statistically significant as the CDS market adjusts to 
incorporate this information. Similarly, if the CDS market is 
an important venue for price discovery, then 2λ  will be  
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model estimation shows that price discovery 
occurs simultaneously on the two markets. 
However, during the period studied — 1 January 
2007 to 19 October 2010 — the coefficients 
suggest that about 70 % of price discovery 
occurred on the CDS market. This is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence, which says that it is 
easier and cheaper to trade and express views on 
credit risk on the CDS than on the bond market. 
Market microstructure. The market micro-
structure concerns the process and outcomes of 
exchanging assets or contracts and how the 
equilibrium prices are reached. In terms of 
efficiency the key concepts are liquidity, volatility 
and transparency. 
Although the notional amount outstanding is 
large, liquidity on the sovereign CDS market 
cannot be considered fully adequate. The liquidity 
of the market seems to differ depending on the 
contract being traded, where liquidity in most 
contracts seems to be reasonably good, especially 
for the larger Member States, but others are less 
liquid. This follows from two observations. First, 
the immediacy of the market — how fast a market 
participant can execute its trading decision and 
find a counterpart for the trade — should be 
relatively low. As the market is OTC, the trading 
process involves a situation where a buyer tries to 
find the seller with the lowest price, and this takes 
time. Finally, the depth of the market — how 
much a market participant can buy or sell without 
changing the price — seems to be fine, but 
depends on the Member State considered. In 
general, transactions are made on a daily basis for 
many Member States, but for some there are holes 
in the time series, an indication of low depth. 
Volatility was generally low prior to the financial 
crisis, after which it picked up. Still, the average 
standard deviation across all Member States’ CDS 
spreads is contained at around 35 basis points 
(excl. Greece), which is much lower than for bank 
CDS. There are, however, large differences 
between default swaps for individual Member 
States. In general, the volatility of the CDS 
market seems to show some efficiency. 
Finally, transparency can be considered low. 
There are few rules that govern trading or regulate 
information dissemination on the OTC market. 
                                                                                  
positive and statistically significant. If both coefficients are 
significant, then both markets contribute to price discovery. 
In the estimation both parameters are significant. The 
Gonzalo and Granger measure ( )122 λλλ −=GG  provides 
an estimate of the relative contribution of the two markets. 
For example, volumes and trading books are not 
publicly available information, which potentially 
leads to asymmetric information and less efficient 
price formation. This assessment is relative to the 
most transparent markets, e.g. exchange-traded 
financial instruments. Compared to certain aspects 
of the bond market, transparency is higher, at least 
for regulators. As this special topic shows, there is 
a lot of information on the CDS market, but it is 
not always available to the general public. 
Final remarks and regulatory initiatives 
The main conclusions from the analysis are that, 
relative to other OTC markets, the sovereign CDS 
market seems to be fairly well structured and 
functioning, but still maturing. There is no 
evidence of any obvious long-term mispricing, 
nor any evidence that developments in the CDS 
market cause higher funding costs for Member 
States. The sovereign CDS market has developed 
and grown in the past few years, but market 
participants’ exposures towards euro-area 
Member States have been broadly stable since the 
onset of the sovereign debt crisis. These 
exposures only pose a limited amount of risk as 
they are generally small, both relative to the total 
outstanding debt and in relation to dealers’ 
managed assets. However, transparency for 
market participants is still lacking in the CDS 
market, as shown in the previous paragraph. 
With the objective of increasing transparency and 
further reducing systemic risk arising from 
derivative markets of all kinds, the European 
Commission has taken several regulatory 
initiatives. For example, the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) requires 
standardised derivatives to be cleared by a central 
counterparty (CCP) and all derivatives 
transactions to be reported to trade repositories. 
This will provide regulators and supervisors with 
more information on trading in derivatives and 
should create a mechanism for detecting the build-
up of risks in the market at an early stage. The 
Regulation on short selling and certain aspects of 
CDS introduces a disclosure regime for 
significant net short positions in listed shares and 
sovereign debt. It also places restrictions on naked 
short sales of these securities, and imposes a ban 
on CDS positions that do not serve to hedge 
exposure to the underlying debt or other 
correlated securities. 
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